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MRP Empirical Paper
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotional responses in young
people.
The chosen target journal is Cognition & Emotion. The scope for this journal indicates that it 
covers research in areas of emotion, with a particular focus on those aspects of emotion related 
to cognitive processes.
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Abstract
Viewing an upsetting mental image through our own eyes (first-person) or through the 
eyes of an observer (third-person) has previously been demonstrated to result in different 
emotional responses to the image. Different emotional outcomes may result from imagery 
as a consequence of visual perspective influencing whether the image is defined according 
to the abstract or concrete self (Libby & Eibach, 2011). The present research was 
interested in investigating this hypothesis to explore the impact of imagery perspective on 
emotional outcomes in young people. One hundred and fifty-six 16-18 year olds recalled a 
personal failure from either the first or third-person visual perspective in a between group 
experimental design. This study extends previous research by including self-views of self­
compassion, self-esteem and shame proneness. It was expected that these self-views 
would interact with the visual perspective to predict the level of state shame and negative 
affect experienced when recalling a failure image. Results revealed no such interaction 
effect, and emotional outcomes from imagery were dependent on individual’s self-views 
regardless of perspective used. This is inconsistent with previous accounts of the role of 
visual imagery perspective and may suggest the need for a developmental account of the 
role of visual imagery perspective in emotion.
Keywords: self; visual perspective; imagery; emotion.
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Introduction
Images of past events or daydreams of future possibilities can enter our minds with 
or without our will. The recollection of a past failure can be particularly upsetting, 
depending on how one subjectively interprets such an event. In some cases, distressing 
events that may have been experienced long ago in adolescence can come to define an 
adult’s sense of self. For example, many emotional disorders in which distressing mental 
imagery plays a key role, e.g. post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD, Holmes, Grey, & 
Young, 2005), social phobia (Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 2000), and depression 
(Patel et al., 2007) have their mean age of onset in adolescence or young adulthood (see 
Burnett Heyes, Lau, & Holmes, 2013).
When picturing events such as memories in the “mind’s eye”, the visual 
perspective used can take one of two forms (Nigro & Neisser, 1983). The first-person, or 
field perspective, means that a person is experiencing the image through their own eyes as 
they would in everyday life. A third-person, or observer perspective, means an image is 
being viewed with the person as a subject of a scene, as if watching themselves in a video.
Prior to a recent proposal by Libby and Eibach (2011), the accepted function of 
visual imagery perspective had remained constant for some time. Using the first-person 
perspective to imagine an event would enhance a connection between the imagined event 
and the present self, whereas the third-person imagery perspective would detach the 
pictured event from the present self. Evidence supporting this function of imagery 
perspective suggested that taking a first-person perspective when imagining an event is 
associated with enhanced emotional reliving (e.g. greater emotional affect/ increased 
activation of emotion related neural areas such as the amygdala) whereas using a third- 
person perspective has been found to decrease or blunt an emotional response relative to
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the first-person perspective (e.g. Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Bemsten & Rubin, 2006; Kenny 
et al, 2009; Mclssac & Eich, 2004; Williams & Moulds, 2007).
However, Libby and Eibach (2011) propose an alternative function of imagery 
perspective. Visual imagery perspective does not directly determine the distance of the 
imagined event from the present experience. Instead, as an event or memory is mentally 
reconstructed, the visual perspective that an individual uses will determine how they 
create meaning from this image. Drawing on cognitive distinctions of information 
processing, they propose that an individual will construct an image from the bottom-up, 
using concrete features of the situation (e.g. facts of the event) when using the first-person 
perspective to picture the image. However, when using the third-person perspective an 
event is understood and meaning is created from the top-down, in terms of abstractions 
that integrate this event with its broader context (e.g. abstracting from the event its 
meaning for the individual, their future and their relationships). For example, the scenario 
of “collecting exam results” may be imagined in terms of “opening the envelope” 
(concrete) or “setting the future career” (abstract), and so different meaning is created 
from this same scenario (collecting results) from the first and third-person perspective 
respectively. In this alternative account, visual imagery perspective is therefore a 
representational tool, determining the information which is processed to create meaning 
from an imagined event.
This alternative account of the function of imagery perspective creates novel 
predictions about the emotional responses to imagery from the first or third-person visual 
perspectives. These novel predictions about emotional outcomes from imagery are 
dependent on an interaction between the function of imagery perspective and an 
individual’s self-view. Previously, the first-person perspective would be seen to heighten 
an emotional response relative to the third-person perspective as a result of the first-person
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enhancing emotional connections between the imagined event and the present concrete 
self. However, for Libby and Eibach (2011) the self is dual faceted and imagery 
perspective differentially highlights these two aspects of the self when people picture life 
events. They draw on James’ (1890/1950) distinction between the experiential T  (self as 
experiencer) and the conceptual ‘me’ (self as object) which will be represented in the first 
and third-person imagery perspective respectively. Specifically, as visual perspective 
varies the information processed to create meaning in an event, a first-person perspective 
will incorporate information from the concrete self (e.g. internal experiences). However, 
the third-person perspective will draw on information from the abstract self (e.g. 
conceptual self-knowledge and self-narratives). Therefore, the third but not the first- 
person visual perspective will involve making meaning of the event using self-referent 
concepts.
The emotional impact of picturing an event or memory from the third-person 
perspective rather than the first-person perspective should therefore depend on the abstract 
meaning of this memory, and a key factor that influences the meaning that is made is an 
individual’s self-view. The term self-view is used here to refer to ways in which an 
individual view’s or responds to themselves, and encompasses the self-referent concepts 
of self-esteem, self-compassion and shame proneness. Although distinct, they are all likely 
to influence the personal meaning made from an event. For example constructing a 
meaning of a failure as “a learning experience” versus “a confirmation of inadequacies” 
will depend upon an individual’s self-views.
So, a memory may be more or less emotional when it is considered in relation to 
the broader context of an individual’s life, depending on the nature of the individual’s self­
views. Self-views will therefore influence the meaning made of a failure image when the 
image is pictured from the third-person perspective, but not from the first-person
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perspective. The third-person perspective then has the potential to heighten emotional 
reactions to imagery relative to the first-person perspective, rather than the emotional 
blunting role of third-person imagery previously documented.
Research has supported this hypothesis that the third-person perspective can 
increase or decrease an images negative emotional impact according to an individual’s 
self-views. For example, Libby, Valenti, Pfent & Eibach (2011) measured undergraduate 
levels of self-esteem and asked them to recall a personal failure from either the first or 
third-person visual perspective. Participants were then asked to report their levels of 
shame experienced when picturing the failure memory. Authors found a significant 
interaction between self-esteem and visual perspective in predicting feelings of shame, 
such that in the third-person perspective, low levels of self-esteem predicted high feelings 
of shame, with an absence of this relationship in the first-person perspective.
Although it is known that subjective views play a key role in explaining reactions 
to recalled and imagined failure (Conner Christensen, Wood & Barrett, 2003), these 
findings indicate that visual imagery perspective also has a role to play. According to 
Libby et al (2011), self-views (e.g. self-esteem) shape the emotional reactions to imagery 
from the third-person perspective. This is because using the third-person perspective 
involves a top-down style of processing in which individuals can draw on their existing 
self-views to define the meaning of a memory. With regard to shame, a negative self-view 
(e.g. low self-esteem) will be used in defining the meaning of the failure memory to the 
present self. This results in a greater attribution of the failure to themselves, and therefore 
greater feelings of shame (e.g. “I am globally defective”) than an individual with a more 
positive self-view (e.g. higher self-esteem) who might attribute failure to the situation (e.g. 
“the exam was badly marked”). Libby et al (2011) therefore conclude that both individual
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self-views and imagery perspective are essential to consider when evaluating emotional 
responses to failure memories.
When considering the emotional responses of adolescents to failure memories, it 
would be expected that experiencing failure could result in feelings of shame (McGregor 
& Elliot, 2005). Shame is an intense negative emotion with negative global attributions of 
failure to the self (Lewis, 1971), so will be positively associated with negative affect.
Although these emotional responses would be anticipated when recalling failures, Libby 
and Eibach’s (2011) proposal highlights that self-views may influence this outcome if the 
failure is recalled from the third-person perspective. This naturally leads to the 
consideration of other self-views which may play a role in determining the emotional 
impact of imagery from different visual perspectives. A sense of personal worth (self­
esteem; Rosenberg, 1965) plays a role in defining the meaning of a failure event but other 
self-views such as self-compassion and shame proneness would also be expected to play a 
defining role.
Self-compassion involves being caring and understanding to ourselves, 
understanding that failure is a common part of humanity and being non-judgementally 
aware of one’s present experience (Neff, 2003) which plays a role in adolescent well­
being (Neff & McGehee, 2010). If levels of self-compassion were incorporated into 
defining the meaning of a failure memory, it would be expected that low rather than high 
levels of self-compassion would result in responding critically to the self in the face of 
failure, and prompt attributions of failure to the self (shame) and further emotional 
distress. Indeed, evidence suggests that levels of self-compassion are negatively associated 
with avoidance strategies in the face of failure (Neff, Hseih & Dejitthirat 2005), and 
avoidance is commonly associated as a behavioural response to shame (e.g. Tangney,
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However, as with self-esteem, self-compassion will influence the emotional impact 
of an image only when an image is pictured from a perspective that allows this conceptual 
information to be incorporated into the processing of the memory (the third-person 
perspective). Therefore, higher levels of self-compassion will predict lower levels of 
emotional distress when recalling a failure image from the third-person perspective 
compared to the first-person perspective, because the compassionate self will be utilised in 
defining the meaning of the image for that individual.
In defining the meaning and emotional impact of a failure memory, an additional 
pertinent self-view is an individual’s propensity to experience shame across a range of 
situations (Tangney & Hearing, 2002), or what will be called their “shame proneness”. 
Those who are highly shame prone will demonstrate a tendency to attribute all flaws to the 
self in a global way. Therefore, an individual’s emotional response to recalling a failure 
will be dependent upon an interaction between an individual’s tendency to experience 
shame and the visual imagery perspective used. Specifically, that higher levels of shame 
proneness will result in higher levels of state shame and emotional distress in third-person 
imagery compared to first-person imagery.
The importance of enhancing our present knowledge of the impact of imagery 
perspective and self-views on emotion is highlighted especially in child and adolescent 
work. Given the purported role of mental imagery in emotional disorders which have their 
average onset in adolescence, and that picturing failure images from the third-person 
perspective contributes to the construction and maintenance of a particular sense of self 
(Libby & Eibach, 2011), it is crucial to investigate the impact of mental imagery on 
emotional distress in young populations.
The present research is therefore extending previous work by Libby et al (2011) to 
evaluate the interaction between self-views and visual imagery perspective in predicting
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emotional outcomes to failure imagery in young people. However, firstly it will establish 
whether there is a relationship between the perspective taken and the outcome emotions of 
shame and negative affect. It is anticipated that, as in previous research (Libby et al,
2011), visual perspective will not have a direct effect on the emotional impact of recalling 
a failure, providing a contradiction to the more traditional expectation of the function and 
impact of visual imagery perspective on emotional response. Secondly, it would be 
expected that there is a relationship between self-views and the level of state shame and 
negative affect that an individual experiences when recalling a failure memory. For 
example, those low in self-esteem and self-compassion will experience greater shame and 
negative affect in the face of failure than those high on these measures (e.g. Leary, Tate, 
Adams, Allen, & Hancock, 2007), and that those high in shame proneness will experience 
high state shame and negative affect relative to those lower in shame proneness.
Finally, and most crucially, it will investigate the interaction between self-views 
and visual imagery perspective in predicting resultant emotion. It is anticipated that visual 
perspective will interact with an individual’s levels of self-esteem, self-compassion and 
shame proneness to predict negative affect and state shame. Specifically, levels of shame 
and negative affect will be higher in third-person perspective memories than in first- 
person perspective memories when the individuals are lower on self-esteem (or self­
compassion), whereas individuals higher in self-esteem (or self-compassion) will 
experience lower levels of emotional distress when using the third-person perspective than 
those using the first-person perspective to recall a failure memory. For shame proneness, 
levels of emotional distress will be higher in the third-person perspective group than in the 
first-person perspective group when the individuals are higher on shame-proneness, 
whereas individuals lower in shame-proneness will experience lower levels of emotional
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distress when using the third-person perspective than those using the first-person 
perspective to recall a failure memory.
Method 
Design
Participants were randomised to one of two groups (first or third-person visual 
imagery perspective) in a between groups experimental design. Analysis considers the 
influence of the continuous independent variables (self-esteem, self-compassion and 
shame proneness), the categorical variable (visual imagery perspective) and their 
interaction on the continuous dependent variables of state shame and negative affect 
experienced by young people.
Participants
Four colleges (three mixed gender, one all young women) in the south of England 
were approached through senior staff members and consented to allow students to be 
approached participate in the study. A sample size of at least 112 participants was required 
in order to detect an effect (R2) of .10 with power at .80 (for three predictor variables; 
Clark-Carter, 1997). Response rate cannot be calculated due to the method of recruitment. 
A total of 210 college students aged between 16-18 years participated through their 
colleges.
Materials 
Experimental manipulation.
Memory recall and perspective manipulation. Participants were asked to recall a 
memory from within the past 5 years of a time they felt they had failed at something that 
was important to them. They were then directed in the visual perspective they should use 
to picture the memory image according to methodology used in Libby and Eibach (2011). 
The instructions were as follows:
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotions
You should use the first-person [third-person] visual perspective to picture 
the situation. With the first-person [third-person] visual perspective you see 
the situation from the same visual perspective you had when the situation 
originally took place. That is, you are looking out at your surroundings 
through your own eyes, [from the same visual perspective an outsider would 
have had when the situation originally took place. That is, you see yourself as 
well as your surroundings in the image.]
Participants were also invited to record key words or describe the content of the image.
Dependent variables: Measures of state affect.
State Shame and Guilt Scale (SSGS). The SSGS (Marschall, Sanftner & Tangney, 
1994) is a 15-item measure, with three subscales, “shame”, “guilt” and “pride”. Each 
subscale has five items, which are responded to along a five point likert scale indicating to 
what extent they are feeling the stated way at the present moment from 1 (not feeling this 
way at all) to 5 (feeling this way strongly), as they experience the image. Instructions were 
adapted to include a direction of maintaining the memory image from the prescribed 
perspective, e.g. “remember to rate each statement based on how you are feeling right at 
this moment, as you picture this experience of failure.” The SSGS Shame subscale was 
used here as a measure of state shame. Each subscale has an inter-item reliability of .89 
(Marschall et al, 1994). Internal reliability of the SSGS shame subscale in the current 
sample was a = .83.
Positive Affect-Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). The PANAS (Watson, Clark 
& Tellegen, 1988) is based on a two-factor model of affect, which posits that Positive 
Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA) are independent dimensions. Respondents rate on a 
five-point Likert-type scale the extent to which they feel at this present moment, each of 
10 positive and 10 negative affective states (e.g. from 1 -  very slightly or not at all to 5 -
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extremely). Instructions were adapted to include a direction of maintaining the memory 
image from the prescribed perspective to read
“Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment, 
when you hold this experience of failure in mind from the first-person perspective 
(through your own eyes) [third-person perspective (through an observers eyes)].”. 
Responses are summed separately for PA and NA, each with a possible score of 10 to 50. 
The PANAS has been shown to be valid and reliable in adolescent samples (Watson,
Clark & Tellegen, 1988). Internal reliability of NA in the current sample was a = .83. 
Independent variables: self-views.
Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale (RSE). The RSE (Rosenberg, 1965) consists of 10 
items measuring global self-esteem rated on a likert scale from 0 (not at all) to 3 (nearly 
everyday).The five negatively-worded items are reverse coded and the mean of all items 
creates an overall level of self-esteem, with higher scores representing higher levels of 
self-esteem (0-3). The RSE is suitable for adolescents as it was originally developed for 
self-esteem assessment in this population. It has shown acceptable reliability and validity 
with Cronbach’s alphas of .74 and .77 (McCarthy & Hoge, 1982). Convergent validity has 
been investigated and the measure was found to have high correlations with other 
measures of self-esteem (e.g. Hagborg, 1993). Internal reliability in the present sample 
was a =.87.
Self-compassion Scale (SCS). The SCS (Neff, 2003) is made up of 26 items rated 
using a likert scale ranging from 1 (almost never) to 5 (almost always). The 26 items make 
up five subscales of self-kindness, common humanity and mindfulness, self-judgement, 
isolation and over-identification. Negative items are reverse coded and the mean of all 26 
items gives the total self-compassion score, ranging from 1-5. Higher scores represent 
higher levels of self-compassion. The SCS has good construct validity, being significantly
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correlated with other scales that measure similar constructs (Neff, 2003). The SCS has 
also been shown to demonstrate good reliability with a Cronbach alpha of .92 (Neff & 
Vonk, 2009). Similar levels of reliability have been show in adolescents, with an alpha of 
.90 (Neff & McGehee, 2010). Despite this, some words were adapted for the present 
sample, reducing assumptions of word knowledge, e.g. “inadequacy” to “feeling not good 
enough”. Internal reliability in the present sample was a = .86.
Shame Scale fo r  Adolescence (SSA). The SSA (John, Simonds, Chester &
Taylor, in prep.) is a 19 item measure in which participants are asked to think of their own 
experiences of when they have felt shame and think of these when rating the 19 items on a 
likert-type scale of statements ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 (a lot). The scale makes up 
three factors of shame: negative evaluation of self (ten items), outward expression (four 
items) and internalised affect (five items). A mean of all scores provides the total shame 
proneness score with higher scores indicating greater shame propensity. John et al (in 
prep.) demonstrated good internal consistency with an overall Cronbach’s alpha of 0.93, 
and good content, criterion and construct validity. Internal reliability in the current sample 
was a = .90.
Manipulation checks.
Perspective manipulation. Use of visual perspective was checked using the 
method utilised in Libby et al (2011). Participants responded yes or no to the question, “as 
you’re picturing it right now, do you see the situation from the visual perspective you had 
[an outsider would have had] when the situation was originally happening?”.
Memory prompt manipulation. As in Libby et al (2011) participants were asked to 
record a few details of the memory in the space provided, and were also asked to rate the 
valence of the recalled event on a seven-point scale, from 1 (extremely negative) to 7 
(extremely positive).
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Memory vividness. Memory vividness was measured by asking participants to 
respond to the question “how vivid is the image?” (Marks, 1973). Responses ranged along 
a likert scale from 1 (perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision) to 5 (no image at all). 
Procedure
Favourable ethical opinion was granted to the current study by the University of 
Surrey Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics Committee (Appendix 1). Colleges 
were approached at first contact by phone, and then by email (Appendix 2). This email 
included a confirmation of favourable ethical opinion, the details of the study and a 
request of consent to recruit. There were two methods of data collection to allow 
sensitivity to curriculum demands. Data was collected either in the lunch hour in a room at 
the college following tutors announcing the researcher’s visit or in the assembly/ tutorial 
time at the college. All questionnaires were completed individually on paper in a group 
setting.
Participants were given information on the study, invited to ask questions and 
informed that completing the questionnaire would be taken as consent to participate in the 
research (Appendix 3). Demographic details were collected. Participants completed the 
self-view measures (SSA, SCS and RSE) and were then asked to recall a failure memory 
from a given perspective, and record the content, vividness and emotional valence of the 
image. Participants then completed the SSGS and PANAS before recording the date of the 
memory in question. Participants finally completed a positive memory writing task to 
alleviate any distress caused when recalling a failure image (based on the writing 
paradigm outlined by Burton and King, 2004). Participants were thanked for their time 
and fully debriefed (Appendix 4). A full copy of the questionnaire can be seen in 
Appendix 5.
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Results
Exclusions
Of the 210 students participating in the study, 54 participants were excluded, with 
the majority of these (n = 41) indicating that they had not pictured a memory of failure 
from the required perspective. Additional reasons for exclusion included not completing 
the questionnaire {n = 8), insufficient clarity of the failure image (scores of 5 on vividness 
scale, n = 1), insufficient emotional negativity of the failure memory (rating of 4+ on the 
negativity scale, n = 2) and an indication from the description of the memory recalled that 
the task was not taken seriously {n = 2). Of the 54 excluded from the study, 23 were first- 
person and 31 were third-person perspective questionnaires, and of the 41 participants 
excluded for not picturing the memory from the required perspective, 19 were first person 
and 22 were third person questionnaires.
The remaining sample consisted of 156 participants (122 women), 76 participants 
in the first-person perspective group and 80 participants in the third-person perspective 
group. The median age was 17 years.
Comparison to final sample: Age and Gender. Comparison between those 
excluded and the final sample was conducted on the 46 excluded responses which had not 
indicated a wish to withdraw from the study (i.e. had completed the questionnaire). Chi 
squared tests were used to compare the proportion of women to men between those 
excluded (30:16) and those included in the study (122:34), which showed no differences 
between these groups (%2 (1, N=  156) = 3.22,/? = .07). However, the age of those 
excluded (Mdn =17, IQR = 16-17) were significantly younger than those included (Mdn = 
17, IQR = 17-17), U= 3252, z = -2.14, p  = .006. Furthermore, the age of those excluded 
because of failing to take the prescribed perspective (n = 41, Mdn = 17, IQR =16-17) 
were significantly younger than those included (£/= 2418, z = -2.64,/? = .008)
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Comparison to final sample: Self-views. For parametric tests all data were shown 
to be approximately normally distributed (see Appendix 6 for normal distribution of self- 
view scores of those excluded and Appendix 9 for normal distribution of scores of those 
not excluded). Reported levels of self-esteem of those excluded (M= 1.61, SD = 0.60) did 
not differ from those who were included in the study (M = 1.57, SD = 0.53; t (200) = 0.40, 
p  = .69) and levels of shame proneness in those excluded (M = 1.48, SD = 0.59) did not 
differ significantly from those who were included (M = 1.53, SD = 0.59; t (200) = -0.57, jo 
= .57). However, the levels of self-compassion of all those excluded (M= 2.77, SD =
0.61), and those excluded because they indicated they had not recalled the memory from 
the required perspective {n = 41, M=  2.73, SD = 0.60) were significantly higher than those 
included in the study (M = 2.49, SD = 0.55); t (200) = 2.93,p  = .004) and (t (195) = 2.43, 
p  = .02) respectively. This group that was excluded due to failure to take the required 
perspective did not differ from the final sample on mean scores of self-esteem (M= 1.58,
SD = 0.61; t (195) = 0.10, p  = .92), or shame proneness (M= 1.47, SD = 0.59; t (195) = - 
0.60,p  = .55).
Furthermore, there were no significant differences between those asked to take the 
first or third-person perspective (who were subsequently excluded due to a failure to take 
this perspective) on measures of self-esteem (first-person, n = 19, M=  1.54, SD = 0.63; 
third-person, n = 22, M =  1.61, SD = 0.61; t (39) = -0.31,p  -  .71), shame proneness (first- 
person M =  1.46, SD = 0.59; third-person M =  1.48, SD = 0.61; t (39) = -0.14, p  = .89) and 
self-compassion (first-person M =  2.66, SD = 0.69; third-person M =  2.79, SD = .52; t (39)
= -0.67, jo = .51) suggesting that failure to take a given perspective (first or third) was not 
associated with these measures.
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Group characteristics
Chi squared tests were used to compare the proportion of women to men in the 
final sample (first-person perspective group, 61:15; third-person perspective group, 61:19) 
which did not differ between groups (%2(1, N=  156) = 031, p  = .54) and independent non- 
parametric tests (Mann-Whitney) were used to compare the age of participants (16, 17 or 
18 years) between groups (first person perspective, Mdn =17, IQR =17-18; third-person 
perspective Mdn =17, IQR = 17-17), which did not significantly differ between groups (U  
= 2920, z = -0.47, p  = .64).
Memory characteristics
Independent Mann-Whitney U tests were used to compare the vividness and 
negativity of the first-person and third-person memories. There was no significant 
difference in the reported vividness of the participants memory of failure between the first 
{Mdn = 2, IQR = 1-2.75) and third {Mdn = 2, IQR = 1-3) perspectives {U= 2624.50, z = - 
\.56,p  = .12). Furthermore, there was no significant difference in the reported negativity 
of the participants failure of memory between the first {Mdn = 2, IQR = 1-2) and third- 
person {Mdn = 2, IQR = 1-2) perspectives {U= 3004, z = -0.14, j9 = .90).
The age of memory in both the first and third-person perspective groups was 
significantly non-normal {D (73) = 0.24, j9 < .001; D (78) = 022, p  < .001); see Appendix 
7). A small number of participants in the first {n = 3) and third-person {n = 2) perspectives 
did not report the age of the memory they recalled. Mann-Whitney tests revealed that the 
age of the memory (in months) recalled did not differ significantly between the first {n =
73, Mdn = 4, IQR = 1-10) and the third person perspectives {n = 78, Mdn = 8, IQR = 1-14; 
£7=2440, z = -1.53,;? = .13).
Participants were invited to record the content of the failure memory which they 
were picturing. Participant responses were coded according to the system in Appendix 8
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by two independent raters. Failure memories were categorised into one of six categories 
according to the dominant context of the failure: moral, academic, skill, social, body 
image and unknown. An interrater reliability analysis using Cohen’s Kappa (k  ) was 
performed to determine consistency among raters, and found to be k  = .90 (jp <001), 95% 
Cl (0.83 - 0.96) which is considered excellent (Landis & Koch, 1977). The majority of 
failure memories recalled were coded as academic failures from both the first-person (n = 
43) and third-person (n = 46) perspectives.
Overall the experimental groups did not differ on age, gender or features associated with 
the memory.
Group characteristics: Self-views
Differences between the first and third-person perspective group means of self­
views were compared using independent t-tests (as data were normally distributed, see 
Appendix 9). First-person and third-person perspective groups did not significantly differ 
in their shame proneness, self-compassion and self-esteem (Table 1).
Table 1
Mean Scores (and Standard Deviations) of Self-views (SSA, SCS and RSE) by Perspective.
Self-view
Visual perspective 
First person Third person t a P
SSA 1.46 (0.62) 1.60 (0.55) -1.51 .13
SCS 2.55 (0.57) 2.44 (0.52) 1.18 .24
RSE 1.62 (0.53) 1.52(0.53) 1.24 .22
Note. SSA = Shame Scale for Adolescents, SCS = Self-compassion scale, RSE = Rosenberg Self­
esteem scale. 
adf= 154.
Perspective X Self-view.
The General Linear Model (GLM) function in SPSS was used to test for an 
interaction effect. The categorical independent variable (visual perspective), the 
continuous variable (self-views of self-esteem, self-compassion or shame proneness) and
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an interaction term (e.g. perspective x self-esteem) were entered with either state shame or 
negative affect as the dependent variable. The interaction term in the GLM function in 
SPSS tests the null hypothesis of homogeneity of regression slopes, with a significant 
effect indicating an effect of the interaction term on the outcome of state shame or 
negative affect. The main outcome of interest in using the GLM was whether the 
interaction term (perspective x self-view variable) was predictive of state shame and 
negative affect but the main effects of this model are also reported in Appendix 12. It was 
anticipated that there would be a main effect of self-views when accounting for other 
variables, but not a main effect of perspective. Assumptions including homogeneity of 
variance, normal distribution of residuals and no influential outliers were met (Appendix 
11).A significant interaction effect would mean that, as predicted, the differences between 
the first and third-person perspective group means of emotional distress (state shame and 
negative affect) differ according to the level of self-views(self-esteem, self-compassion 
and shame proneness).
However, data in Table 2 indicate no significant interaction effects on state shame 
or negative affect, with the interaction terms explaining very little variance in the 
emotions of state shame and negative affect (e.g. less than 0.5% variance in state shame 
and negative affect explained by any of the self-views). This absence of variation in group 
means is clearly portrayed in Figures 1 and 2. This suggests that self-views of self-esteem, 
self-compassion and shame proneness do not moderate a relationship between visual 
perspective and state shame or negative affect -  contrary to previous findings.
The absence of a main effect of Perspective in this model, and the presence of a 
main effect of self-views can be seen in Appendix 12.
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Table 2
Interaction between Visual Perspective and Self-views to predict State Shame and Negative
Dependent
Variable
Self-view F a P Partial rj2 B Lower Upper
State Shame RSE 0.35 .55 .002 0.84 -1.97 3.64
State Shame SCS 0.06 .80 .000 0.35 -2.45 3.15
State Shame SSA 0.54 .46 .004 0.89 -1.50 3.28
Negative Affect RSE 0.31 .58 .002 1.44 -3.69 6.58
Negative Affect SCS 0.20 .66 .001 -1.14 -6.22 2.95
Negative Affect SSA 0.32 .58 .002 1.26 -3.16 5.68
Note. RSE = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, SCS = Self-Compassion Scale, SSA = Shame Scale for
Adolescents. 
adf= 1,152
Effect of perspective
Given the non-significant interaction effects seen in Table 2, the GLM model was 
run again but this time without the interaction term. The effect of perspective was 
investigated in addition to the effect of self-views.
GLM analysis revealed no main effect of visual perspective; when self-views of 
self-esteem, self-compassion and shame proneness are accounted for, there remain no 
significant differences in state shame or negative affect between visual perspective groups 
(Table 3). There appears to be a small effect (Cohen, 1988) of perspective on state shame 
even when these self-views are accounted for, however variance in state shame and 
negative affect accounted for by the visual perspective used and the associated error 
(whilst adjusting for self-views) is very small for both shame and negative affect (<1%).
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Effect of Self-view
GLM analysis (without the interaction term) demonstrated a significant main effect 
of self-views. There are consistent significant differences in levels of state shame and 
negative affect according to self-views (Table 4) such that higher levels of self-esteem and 
self-compassion predict significantly lower levels of state shame and negative affect 
(Figure 1 and 2). As expected, the inverse relationship was observed for shame proneness 
(Figure 1c and 2c). Furthermore, the effect of self-views on state shame and negative 
affect remained significant when the interaction term was included in the model (see 
Appendix 12).
As seen in Table 4 (partial t/2), each of the self-views and their associated error can 
explain no more than 20% of the variance in negative affect. Each of the self-views and 
their associated error can explain between 25% (self-compassion) and 37% (shame 
proneness) of the variance in state shame.
Table 4
Main effect of Self Views on State Shame and Negative Affect
Dependent
Variable Predicted by F a P Partial t f B Lower Upper
State Shame RSE 62.21 <001 .29 -5.58 -6.98 -4.19
State Shame SCS 50.07 <001 .25 -4.99 -6.38 -3.59
State Shame SSA 90.42 <001 .37 5.71 4.53 6.90
Negative Affect RSE 18.34 <001 .11 -5.55 -8.11 -2.99
Negative Affect SCS 11.25 .001 .07 -4.29 -6.82 -1.76
Negative Affect SSA 36.58 <001 .19 6.72 4.53 8.92
Note. RSE = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, SCS = Self-Compassion Scale, SSA = Shame Scale for 
Adolescents.
adf= 1,153
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Discussion
The present study tested the hypothesis that self-views will interact with the visual 
imagery perspective to predict the extent of negative emotions resulting from imagery of a 
personal failure. Contrary to expectations, the results demonstrated that there was no such 
interaction effect with the self-views of self-esteem, self-compassion or shame proneness 
in the present sample of young people. Furthermore, although it was expected that visual 
imagery perspective would not predict levels of state shame and negative affect, there was 
an indication of some effect of perspective on state shame in addition to self-views, which 
as expected were predictive of state shame and negative affect.
The role of perspective
Previous accounts of the function of visual imagery perspective (e.g. Mclssac & 
Eich, 2004; Bemsten & Rubin, 2006) suggest that the perspective used determines 
whether people interpret images in an emotionally detached manner (third-person 
perspective) or an emotionally involved manner (first-person perspective), with evidence 
of greater emotion in first rather than third-person imagery. However in the present study, 
young people’s feelings of state shame and negative affect when recalling a personal 
failure did not significantly differ according to the visual perspective used.
More recent accounts of the function of visual imagery perspective (e.g. Libby & 
Eibach, 2011) suggest that the perspective used determines the process which people use 
to reconstruct events. Specifically that an individual will construct an image from the 
bottom-up using concrete features of the situation when using the first-person perspective 
to recall the memory. However, when using the third-person perspective a memory is 
understood and meaning is created from the top-down, in terms of abstractions that 
integrate this memory with its broader context. It is this top-down processing that 
incorporates an individual’s self-views. Memories imagined can be emotional because of
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the concrete features of the event (bottom-up, first-person processing) or because of the 
meaning of the event to the individuals broad life context (top-down, third-person 
processing). If the visual perspective used to imagine a failure determines the information 
used to process and reconstruct the memory, it should not on its own predict the 
abstractions made from this image. Concurrent with this proposal, previous studies had 
found that the visual perspective taken did not directly predict the emotional outcome of 
imagery, rather the effect depended on an individual’s self-views (e.g. Libby et al, 2011).
In the present study young people’s feelings of state shame and negative affect 
when recalling a personal failure did not differ according to the visual perspective used. In 
both visual perspectives, both state shame and negative affect were elevated relative to 
past reported norms (in mixed white adult non clinical samples, e.g. Marschall, 1996 and 
Crawford & Henry, 2004 respectively) suggesting that participants were experiencing 
negative feelings after they had recalled failure. Although perspective did not significantly 
vary the level of emotional response, there was evidence of a small effect of perspective 
on feelings of state shame, such that there were higher levels of state shame in third rather 
than first-person imagery of failure. This small effect is contrary to the direction predicted 
by the emotional distancing function of third-person visual imagery perspective, and is not 
anticipated by the more recent account of the function of visual imagery perspective.
It may be that the small effect of greater shame in third rather than first-person 
imagery is a reflection of the third rather than first-person perspective involving greater 
focussing attention on oneself. Shame, as a self-conscious or self-reflexive emotion is an 
emotional reaction to the self rather than environment (Tracy & Robins, 2004) and is 
suggested to involve taking another’s perspective on the self (Crozier, 1998). Therefore 
focusing visual attention on the self in the mind’s eye may be more shame inducing than 
using a first-person perspective, but not necessarily induce more negative affect (an
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotions 32
emotional response that is not self-reflexive). However, this effect of perspective on state 
shame was small, and when accounting for visual perspective, self-views were shown to 
be unique in predicting the extent of shame experienced, suggesting that self-views are 
more indicative of shame and negative affect reactions from failure imagery than any 
possible small effect of perspective.
The role of self-views
The personal meaning made from recalled and imagined failure was previously 
shown to be crucially dependent on individual self-views (Libby et al, 2011), as the self is 
crucial in memory reconstruction (Conway, 2005). In the present study there was an 
expectation that negative self-views would lead to a greater attribution of a memory of 
personal failure to oneself (state shame), and increased negative affect, compared to more 
positive self-views. With regard to self-esteem, that lower levels of self-esteem, with a 
lower perceived self-worth and competence (Rosenberg, 1965), would result in greater 
levels of shame and negative affect. This was found, consistent with previous findings 
(e.g. Libby et al, 2011) and extends the importance of self-esteem in adaptive emotional 
responses to failures in the present (e.g. Brown & Marshall, 2001) to recalled and 
imagined failures in young people too.
Furthermore, this effect was extended to other self-views. Self-compassion 
involves being caring and understanding to ourselves and understanding that failure is a 
common part of humanity (Neff, 2003). It is therefore reasonable that higher levels of self­
compassion would lead an individual to construct meaning which attributes failure to less 
dispositional aspects of the self and take a less critical approach to one’s failure 
experiences (resulting in reduced emotional distress) relative to lower levels of self­
compassion. Present results confirm this effect, supporting the importance of self­
compassion in facilitating less negative emotional responses to failure (e.g. Neff, Hsieh, &
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Dejitterat, 2005) and extending the positive effect of self-compassion to recollections of 
failure beyond the academic field and of difficult past events up to 5 years previously.
These findings are of special relevance given the recent argument that self-compassion is 
more beneficial in young people than self-esteem (Neff, Kirkpartrick & Rude, 2007).
Although the present study highlights both self-esteem and self-compassion are effective 
in moderating responses to failure memories (in line with previous research; Neff & Vonk, 
2009), self-compassion has been indicated as a useful alternative to self-esteem because 
self-compassion can be available in the face of failure, when self-esteem is crucially 
threatened (Neff et al, 2007).
Furthermore, shame proneness was expected to be crucial in predicting the 
meaning that an individual made of their failure memory, and therefore strongly 
influencing the shame and negative affect experienced when recalling a personal failure.
This effect was found and is understood to reflect that failure for individuals with a high 
rather than low propensity to experience shame was more likely to be a confirmation of 
global incompetence (McGregor & Elliot, 2005).
Overall, these main effects of self-views on the emotional outcomes of imagery 
reflect that consideration of the self is crucial in memory reconstruction (Conway, 2005). 
Additional self-views not accounted for in the present study may have also had a role to 
play. For example, attachment anxiety has been demonstrated to be of particular relevance 
in rating relationship quality following relational imagery from the third person 
perspective, but not the first-person perspective ( Marigold, Eibach, Libby, Holmes &
Ross, 2011). The content of failures recalled in the present study included mainly 
academic but also interpersonal failures, and even when an individual reported a failure 
that might appear to just involve that individual (e.g. failing an exam), individual 
descriptions of this failure often included a relational element (e.g. a mention of “letting a
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loved one down”). Future research might consider that for young people, failing an exam 
might indicate a threat of loss (e.g. of parental love or approval; McGregor & Elliot, 2005) 
and therefore attachment security and attachment patterns in relationships may be an 
additional important predictor for emotional responses to failure imagery.
The interaction between perspective and self-views
It had been anticipated that these self-views would interact with visual imagery 
perspective of failure to predict negative emotional outcomes. However, results indicate 
that contrary to previous findings, self-views appear to play as influential a role in 
determining reactions to failure imagery from both the first-person and third-person visual 
perspectives in the present sample of young people.
To understand these findings, we need to acknowledge an assumption made by the 
present study, and the theory of Libby & Eibach (2011), which is that visual imagery 
perspective determines the level of processing of a memory (top-down or bottom-up). The 
absence of an interaction effect in the present study suggests that prior self-knowledge 
influences emotional outcomes of imagery equally, regardless of whether the image is 
constructed from the top-down (third) or from the bottom-up (first). This is contrary to 
evidence which indicates that self-views influence cognitive responses in a top-down 
subjective manner rather than a bottom-up objective way (e.g. Cacioppo, Petty & Sidera, 
1982).
This then leads to a question of the accuracy of such an assumption. Perhaps the 
extrapolation of the apparent dichotomy in cognitive processing (top-down/ bottom-up) to 
imagery perspective is unwise, when it has been demonstrated that top-down and bottom- 
up processes may represent overlapping processes rather than dichotomous constructs in 
visual attention (e.g. Sarter, Givens, & Bruno, 2001). Furthermore, that the two visual 
perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but both may be experienced during
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the same recall of one event, shifting between the two such that one can exist along with 
the other (Rice & Rubin, 2009).
However, if the visual perspective used is assumed to determine the level of 
processing of an image in all ages, then a consideration of developmental processes is 
necessary. It is through top-down processing that an individual creates meaning from an 
image by drawing on their self-views (Libby & Eibach, 2011). However, the neural areas 
associated with cognitive control involved in top-down processing of a memory (e.g. 
preffontal cortex; Ishai, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000b; Ochsner et al, 2009) develop 
functionally and structurally throughout childhood and into adolescence (Dumontheil, 
Burgess, & Blakemore, 2008). In fact, young people (aged 10-22 years) show an age 
related increase in activation of preffontal areas which is associated with improvement in 
their ability to reappraise a negative image to effectively modulate affect (McRae et al,
2012). If young people have not fully developed these control processes which incorporate 
self-views to regulate emotion, the emotions activated from bottom-up processing may be 
pervasive in determining the emotional responses to upsetting imagery (with the third- 
person perspective having little modulatory effect on emotion).
It might be considered that the absence of an interaction effect for negative affect 
is a reflection of the mixture of emotion words used in the measure. The PANAS measure 
asks participants to rate their emotions on words that are both self-conscious emotions 
(e.g. guilt) and those that are not (e.g. distressed). Self-conscious emotions differ from 
basic emotions because they require self-awareness and self-representations (Tracy &
Robins, 2004). Therefore negative affect includes both “I” and “me” emotional states.
Future studies might consider that negative affect may be less likely to be dependent on 
self-views than feelings of shame, but with some items of the scale confounding this 
effect.
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The lack of an interaction between self-views and visual perspective in the 
emotional outcomes of imagery might also be a reflection of limitations of the perspective 
manipulation in the present study. It is possible that the present methodology was not 
sufficient for young people to form or maintain an image from a given perspective and the 
manipulation checks were not sufficient in capturing this. The apparent difficulty for this 
sample to take the prescribed perspective is reflected in the higher rate of those excluded 
for failing to take the perspective asked (20%) whereas previous studies report much 
lower rates (4%; Libby & Eibach, 2011). Future research, particularly in younger samples, 
might utilise creative methods of prescribing visual perspective such as video footage of a 
failure scenario from different perspectives. Equally, asking participants to rate the extent 
to which an image is first and/or third-person perspective, acknowledges that these two 
perspectives might well be independent.
A final consideration for the absence of an interaction is that asking participants to 
recall an event which they have conceptualised as personal failure suggests an individual 
will need to use top-down processing to initially construct the memory. When individuals 
were then asked to use the first-person perspective it is possible that the previously 
Constructed meaning of the image as a personal failure played a role in determining the 
emotional outcome. The result being that the impact of the event on the individual’s life 
more broadly was playing a role in both first and third-person visual perspective 
conditions, rather than just third-person imagery. However, this effect would be unique to 
the present sample as present methodology is the same as previous studies which did find 
an interaction effect (Libby et al, 2011).
In summary, the present study found no interaction effect, so that self-views were 
as predictive of emotion responses to imagery in the first-person perspective as they were 
in the third. Although this is inconsistent with the main finding of Libby et al (2011), it is
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of note here that they found, contrary to expectation, self-esteem was positively associated 
with shame in the first-person perspective. This effect did not support their hypothesis and 
yet remained unexplained.
Implications
Present findings indicate that greater consideration and investigation is needed to 
explore the fimction of visual imagery perspective in young people, and its impact on 
emotional responses to imagery. Theories of autobiographical memory retrieval and 
imagery (e.g. Libby & Eibach, 2011; Sutin & Robins, 2008) fail to take a developmental 
perspective to both memory representations and the self. Theories which account for the 
fluidity and multiplicity of “selves” in adolescence (e.g. Harter, 1998), the fluidity of 
visual memory perspective and the neurological development of areas involved in memory 
processing and retrieval are necessary.
Therapeutic approaches which address imagery (e.g. Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy) have advocated the use of both visual perspectives for changing emotional 
responses to imagery. Some authors have argued that taking the third-person perspective 
in imagery leaves individuals feelings helpless and alienated (Hackmann, Bennett-Levy & 
Holmes, 2011), whereas others advocate the use of third-person imagery in imagery 
rescripting when incorporating modified self-views into an image to redefine its meaning 
and emotional impact (e.g. Wild & Clark, 2011). In the present sample there may have 
been some indication that taking a third-person perspective leads to greater experiencing 
of shame than taking the first-person perspective, but modifying visual perspective alone 
does not influence the extent to which self-views predict the emotional impact of a failure 
memory. It is possible that in adolescents any potential adaptive effect of modifying 
emotion by using the third-person perspective as a means of incorporating protective self­
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views is reduced, having implications for the application of therapeutic imagery work for 
younger populations.
Conclusion
Contrary to previous accounts, Libby and Eibach (2011) argue that the emotional 
outcomes of imagery result from visual perspective influencing whether the image is 
defined according to the abstract or concrete self. Specifically, when using the third- 
person perspective a mental visual image will be defined according to an individual’s 
abstract self and will therefore cause distress if the individual’s self-views encourage a 
negative and distressing meaning of the image.
It was expected that the visual perspective used by young people to imagine a 
personal failure would not alone predict the emotional outcome of imagery, but that their 
self-reported self-views of self-esteem, self-compassion and shame proneness would show 
a direct effect. It was further expected that these self-views would interact with visual 
perspective to predict the emotional outcome of imagery. In a similar vein to previous 
research, the present study demonstrates the importance of subjective views of the self in 
determining the emotional reactions to distressing failure memories for young people. 
However, contrary to previous findings, these self-views do not interact with the visual 
perspective used to imagine the memory in the mind’s eye. Therefore, promotion of 
positive self-views may result in less maladaptive emotional outcomes when recalling 
failures, and for the present sample the visual perspective used did not alter this effect.
The assumptions made of the role of imagery perspective in the present study may be its 
greatest weakness. A greater inspection of the function of imagery perspective in children 
and young people from a developmental perspective would provide greater understanding 
of the potential role of imagery in maintaining negative self-views and perpetuating 
negative emotional outcomes of memories.
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Professor Bertram Opltz
Chair: Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics Faculty of
Arts and Human SciencesCommittee 
University of Surrey
Faculty  O ffice
,AD B udding
Guildford. Surrey GU2 7XH UK
Alice Williams
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
School of Psychology
T-.Ü1A (0)1483 669445 
F ^4(0)1483669550
University of Surrey
8* January 2013
Dear Alice
Reference: 826-PSY-12
Title of Project: Does the visual perspective used to picture â failure event 
determine the role of the self-concepts of shame-proneness, self-compassion 
and self-esteem in shaping young people’s  negative reactions to this event?
Thank you for your submission of the above, proposai.;
The Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics Committee has now given a 
favourable ethical opinion.
If there are any significant changes to your proposal which require further scrutiny, 
please contact the Faculty Ethics Committee before proceeding with your Project,
Yours sincerely
Chair
/
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Dear Sir/ Madam,
UNIVERSITY OF
My name is Alice Williams and I am currently training to be a Clinical Psychologist on a 
Doctoral Program. I would like to invite you to allow me to provide your students with an 
opportunity to participate in my research.
The aim of the research is to develop a better understanding of how remembering a time 
that young people (16-18 years) feel that they have experienced failure, influences the way 
they feel now. This research is supervised by Mary John (HCPC Registered Chartered 
Clinical Psychologist and Course Director at the University of Surrey) and Laura 
Simonds (Lecturer of Psychology and Associate Fellow of the British Psychological 
Society)and has received a favourable ethical opinion from the Faculty of Arts and Human 
Sciences Ethics Committee at the University of Surrey.
What will your students be asked to do?
I am going to ask young people from your college to fill in some questionnaires. The 
questionnaires look at different feelings and emotions including shame, mood, self­
esteem, and self-compassion. I will also ask for people to remember a time from their past 
when they feel that they have failed at something, to find out exactly how young people 
feel when they are asked to remember a particular event. This should take approximately 
30 minutes, and we can arrange a time that is convenient for the students to complete this.
No student will have to complete the study. They are free to end their participation in the 
study by choosing not to complete the questionnaire. It is not anticipated that students will 
experience any residual negative effects as a result of participation in this study, although 
they will be directed to discuss any concerns with their college counsellor or form tutor.
Writing up the research
I am hoping the questionnaires and task that I ask students to complete will provide insight 
into how young people’s experiences of failure influence how they feel when they are 
asked to think about this event. It is hoped that these results will be published in a 
scientific journal, and will have an impact on the clinical practice of professionals working 
with young people. However, nobody will know who took part in this research, and your 
name or school will not be on any of the information that is published or available to 
others.
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I would like your consent to invite students from your college to give their consent to 
participate in my study. Data will only be collected if both yourself and each student 
agrees to participate in the research. Please contact me with any concerns at 
a.i .williams@surrev.ac.uk
Best wishes,
Alice Williams 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
a.j .williams@surrey.ac.uk
Supervised by:
Mary John
HCPC Registered Clinical 
Psychologist and 
Programme Director
m.j ohn@surrey.ac.uk
Laura Simonds
Lecturer of Psychology 
and Associate Fellow 
of the BPS
l.simonds@surrey.ac.uk
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Participant information sheet
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UNIVERSITY OF
What is the impact of remembering failure on how adolescents currently 
feel?
My name is Alice Williams and I am training to become a Clinical Psychologist at the 
University of Surrey, Guildford. This means I already have a university degree in 
Psychology, and am taking my studies further. As part of this training I spend some time 
working with people with lots of different difficulties, including young people, and I also 
have to complete a research project. I would like to invite you to take part in my research 
study, which has received a favourable ethical opinion from the Faculty of Arts and 
Human Sciences Ethics Committee at the University of Surrey. Before you decide, you 
need to know what you will be asked to do. Please take the time to read this information.
What is the study about?
The aim of this study is to develop a better understanding of how young people see 
themselves, and how remembering a time that young people feel that they have failed, 
influences the way they feel now. I am particularly interested in the different ways we can 
picture a memory in our “minds eye”, because other researchers have found that this is an 
important part of understanding our memories.
What will I be asked to do?
I am going to ask young people from your college to fill in some questionnaires. The 
questionnaires look at different ways we see ourselves such as self-esteem, and different 
feelings and emotions including shame. I will also ask for people to remember a time from 
their past when they feel that they have failed at something important to them, because I 
would like to find out exactly how people feel when they are asked to remember a 
particular event. To do this I need a large number of 16-18 year olds to fill in the 
questionnaires. Completing these tasks should take no more than 30 minutes, and I would 
ask that you would cooperate fully with the questions asked in the questionnaire.
Do I have to take part?
No, taking part in this study is entirely up to you. To help you decide whether or not to 
take part you can talk it over with others. You can also contact me if you have any 
questions. Even if you do take part, you can choose not to answer all of the questions, and 
end participation in the research, without giving a reason and without consequence. In this 
case, any answers you had provided will be destroyed.
Who will know what I say?
I will not ask you for your name, and your personal details such as your gender, age and 
college will be kept nameless. This information will be stored securely in a password- 
locked document, stored at the University of Surrey, in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act 1998 and will be destroyed after five years. Research is always supervised 
by someone senior to me, and this supervisor may look over some of the information I 
have collected. I will not know who has provided which pieces of information, and neither 
will these supervisors.
What happens once the research is completed?
I am hoping the questionnaires and task that I ask you to do will help me to understand 
how the way young people see themselves can influence how they feel when they are
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asked to think about a time they feel they have failed. If this provides a really good 
understanding then my findings might be published in a scientific journal. I might also 
feed back the results of my research to other professionals to help professionals work with 
children and teenagers who are experiencing problems in their lives. However, nobody 
will know who took part in this research, and your name or school will not be on any of 
the information that is published or available to others.
What are the benefits of taking part in this research?
The research provides an opportunity for you share a failure experience. It is only by 
researching real people and real issues, can we discover what’s working and what needs 
improving. So your input to this research is vital. You will be contributing to an important 
piece of research that might improve professionals understanding and health treatment of 
others in the future.
Are there any downsides to taking part?
Some of the questions might be quite personal, and you will be asked to think of a time in 
the past that you feel you have failed at something. If you feel a question is too personal 
you can end your participation in the study at any time. If you feel that you need to talk to 
someone after you have taken part in this study then please speak to your form tutor or 
college counsellor. If you or your parents have any questions or concerns about you taking 
part in this study, please contact Alice Williams (Principal investigator) on 
a.j .williams@surrey.ac.uk.
Thank-you for taking the time to read this.
By proceeding to the next page you are agreeing that you have read and understood this 
information, any questions have been answered and give you voluntarily give your
consent to participate in this research.
Please proceed to the next page if you wish to continue.
Alice Williams 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
University of Surrey 
a.j.williams@surrey.ac.uk
Supervised bv
Mary John
HCPC Registered Clinical Psychologist and 
Programme Director
m.j ohn@surrey.ac.uk
Laura Simonds
Lecturer of Psychology and Associate 
Fellow of the BPS
l.simonds@surrey.ac.uk
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UNIVERSITY OF
Thank-you for participating in our study.
We are interested in the negative emotions young people might experience 
when they are asked to recall a time in the past that they feel they may have 
failed at something important to them.
We are particularly interested in the influence of the visual perspective that is 
used to picture the memory in your mind’s eye. We are asking some 
participants to picture a memory from the first-person (as if through their 
own eyes), and we are asking other participants to picture a memory in their 
mind from the third-person perspective (as if  through the eyes of an outside 
observer). Research suggests that people will have different emotions, 
depending on which perspective they picture the image from.
Another particular interest is how some aspects of who we are such as our 
self-esteem, how kind we are to ourselves in difficult times, and our tendency 
to feel ashamed, might play a role in influencing how we might feel after 
remembering and picturing in our mind a failure.
If you have any further questions or queries, please contact the researcher, 
Alice Williams, at a.i .williams@surrey.ac.uk. You can also contact Mary 
John (m.j ohn@surrev. ac .uk) or the head of the school of Psychology at the 
University of Surrey, Peter Hegarty (p .hegartv@surrev.ac.uk)
Thank-you.
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Participant Protocol
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Thank-you for agreeing to take part in this study. Please complete the
following questions.
Please tell us your age in years e.g. 17:
Please indicate your gender: 
Male [ ]
Female [ ]
Please go to the next page
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SSA
It is common for young people to experience feelings of shame. However, people vary in 
the type of situation that makes them feel shame or ashamed. Shame can occur when you 
have done something or when someone else has done something to you.
Here are some examples of situations that might make young people feel shame:
• You are being bullied
• You make a mistake in front of your whole class and everyone laughs
• You do badly in a test and you feel like you let yourself or your family down
• Your family can’t afford to buy you all the newest gadgets or most fashionable clothes
• You are horrible about your best friend behind his/her back
IMPORTANT
Can you think of some situations that have happened recently where you have felt shame? 
Please write down a few situations like the examples above:
1.
2.
Please go to the next page
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EXAMPLE: Thinking back to times when you have felt shame, if very often think “I am rubbish 
at everything” then you would circle the number 3, as shown below.
Not at A little Quite a bit A lot 
all bit
I thought “I am rubbish at everything”____________ 0________ 1________ 2_______
Complete the statements below thinking back to the times you have felt shame.
When I felt shame......... Not at A little Quite A lot
all bit a bit
I thought “I have let other people down” 0 1 2 3
I felt worthless and small 0 1 2 3
I thought “Other people must think I am no good” 0 1 2 3
I thought “I am a nasty person” 0 1 2 3
I wanted to shout and scream 0 1 2 3
I felt angry at other people 0 1 2 3
I wanted to seek revenge 0 1 2 3
I thought “No one likes me” 0 1 2 3
I felt disappointed 0 1 2 3
I thought “Other people must think I am stupid” 0 1 2 3
I wanted to punch walls or break things 0 1 2 3
I felt sad 0 1 2 3
I had a horrible feeling inside 0 1 2 3
I thought “I am no good” 0 1 2 3
I felt embarrassed 0 1 2 3
I thought “Other people must think I am nasty” 0 1 2 3
I thought “I am stupid” 0 1 2 3
I felt frustrated 0 1 2 3
I thought “It is better if I was not around” 0 1 2 3
Please go to the next page
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SCS
HOW I TYPICALLY ACT TOWARDS MYSELF IN DIFFICULT TIMES
Please read each statement carefully before answering. To the left of each item (under “Your 
rating”, indicate how often you behave in the stated manner, using the following scale:
SCALE:
Almost Never 
always
1 2
Your
rating: Statements:
1 I’m unkind to myself when I feel I’m not “good enough” .
2 When I’m feeling sad, angry, lonely, or afraid I tend to focus on and worry about 
everything that’s wrong.
3 When things are going badly for me, I remember that difficulties are part of life, 
and that everyone goes through them.
4 When I think about things I don’t do well, I feel separate and cut off from 
everybody else in the world.
5 I try to be loving towards myself when I’m feeling sad, angry, lonely, or afraid.
6 When I fail at something important to me I feel completely stupid.
7 When I’m sad, angry, lonely or afraid, I remind myself that lots of other people 
have these feelings too.
8 When times are really difficult, I am very hard on myself.
9 When something upsets me I try to notice my emotions and not get carried away 
by them.
10 When I feel not “good enough” in some way, I try to remind myself that other 
people sometimes feel this way too.
11 I’m unkind and impatient towards the parts of my personality/me I don’t like.
12 When I’m having a really hard time, I give myself the caring and kindness I need.
13 When I’m feeling sad, angry, lonely, or afraid, I feel most other people are usually
Almost
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happier than I am.
14 When something really upsetting happens, I try to take a balanced view of things.
15 I try to see my failures as part of life.
16 When I see parts of myself that I don’t like, I get down on myself/give myself a 
hard time.
17 When I fail at something important to me, I try to not make it a bigger deal than it 
is.
18 When I’m really struggling, I feel like other people usually have an easier time of 
it.
19 I’m kind to myself when things go wrong and I’m feeling bad.
20 When something upsets me I get carried away with my feelings and “lose it.”
21 I can be a bit mean to myself when I’m feeling bad or upset.
22 When I’m feeling sad, angry, lonely or afraid, I try to be curious about my feelings 
and not ignore them.
23 I tell myself I’m still okay when I make a mistake or don’t do well at something.
24 When something painful happens I make a big deal out of it.
25 When I fail at something that’s important to me, I feel alone in my failure.
26 I try to be understanding and patient towards the parts of my personality/me that I 
don’t like.
Please go to the next page
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RSE
Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. If you 
strongly agree place an “X” in the Strongly Agree box. If you agree with the statement, 
place an “X” under Agree. If you disagree, place an “X” under Disagree. If you strongly 
disagree, place an “X” under Strongly Disagree.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Disagree Strongly
Disagree
I feel that I am a person of worth, at least 
on an equal plane with others.
I feel that I have a number of good 
qualities.
All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a 
failure.
I am able to do things as well as most 
other people.
I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
I take a positive attitude toward myself.
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
I wish I could have more respect for 
myself.
I certainly feel useless at times.
At times I think I am no good at all.
Please go to the next page
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We would now like to ask you to think of a time that you failed at something that is 
important to you. This might be a social or interpersonal failure, an academic failure, a 
failure in a competitive event, or any time you failed at something that was important to 
you. This failure will be the result of an action, something that you did.
This memory must be from within the past 5 years, and should be of an event that 
occurred at a particular time and place, not a summary of something that happened many 
times.
You will soon be asked to picture this moment, but please first read the instructions on 
how you should picture the event.
You should use the first-person [third-person1] visual perspective to picture the situation. 
With the first-person [third-person] visual perspective you see the situation from the same 
visual perspective you had when the situation originally took place. That is, you are 
looking out at your surroundings through your own eyes, [from the same visual 
perspective an outsider would have had when the situation originally took place. That is, 
you see yourself as well as your surroundings in the image.]
As you're picturing it right now, do you see the situation from the visual perspective you 
[an outside observer would have had] had when the situation was originally happening?
(Place an X in the box)
Yes [ ] No [ ]
It would be helpful if you could take a few moments to briefly describe the content of 
what you are picturing. You could write it in full, or use some key words to describe the 
picture.
1 Brackets “[ ]” indicate the third-person perspective condition.
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Take another moment to picture this scene, and hold it in mind from the first-person 
[third-person] perspective as you answer the following questions:
As you picture this experience of failure, from the first-person perspective (through 
your own eyes) [third-person perspective (through an observers eyes)], please indicate 
the vividness of the image in your mind. Mark the appropriate number.
1 2 3 4 5
Perfectly clear Clear and Moderately clear Vague and No image at all
and as vivid as 
normal vision
reasonably vivid and vivid dim
How negative do you feel that the event that you have been picturing was for you?
Extremely
negative
Quite
negative
A little bit 
negative
Neutral A little bit 
positive
Quite
positive
Extremely
positive
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please go to the next page
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SSGS
Take a minute and think about the experience of failure that you have been picturing, 
from the first-person perspective (through your own eyes) [third-person perspective 
(through an observers eyes)]. The following are some statements that may or may not 
describe how you are feeling right now. Please rate each statement using the 5 point scale 
below. Remember to rate each statement based on how you are feeling right at this 
moment, as you picture this experience of failure.
PLACE AN “X” IN THE BOX THAT MATCHES HOW YOU FEEL...
1 2 3 4 5
Not 
feeling 
this way 
at all
Feeling 
this way 
somewhat
Feeling 
this way 
very 
strongly
1 .1 feel good about myself.
2 .1 want to sink into the floor 
and disappear
3. I feel remorse, regret
4 .1 feel worthwhile, valuable
5 .1 feel small
6 .1 feel tension about something 
I have done
7 .1 feel capable, useful.
8 .1 feel like I am a bad person.
9 .1 cannot stop thinking about 
something bad I have done.
10.1 feel proud.
11.1 feel humiliated, disgraced.
12.1 feel like apologising, 
confessing.
13.1 feel pleased about 
something I have done.
14.1 feel worthless, powerless.
15.1 feel bad about something I 
have done.
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PANAS
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then list the number from the scale below next to each word.
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment, 
when you hold this experience of failure in mind from the first-person perspective 
(through your own eyes) [third-person perspective (through an observers eyes)].
1 2 3 4 5
Very slightly A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely
or not at all
My
score
My
score
1. Interested 11. Irritable
2. Distressed 12. Alert
3. Excited 13 . ashamed
4. Upset 14. Inspired
5. Strong 15. Nervous
6. Guilty 16. Determined
7. Scared 17. Attentive
8. Hostile 18. Jittery
9. Enthusiastic 19. Active
10. Proud 20. Afraid
Please go to the next page
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Finally, we would like to ask you a few further details about the experience of failure that 
you remembered and held in your mind.
When did this experience of failure happen?
Year_______________________
Month
Please go to the next page
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We would finally like to ask you to think of the most wonderful experience or experiences 
in your life, happiest moments, ecstatic moments, perhaps from being in love, or from 
listening to music, or suddenly “being hit” by a book or painting or from some great 
creative moment. Choose one such experience or moment. Try to imagine yourself at that 
moment, including all the feelings and emotions associated with the experience.
Now write about the experience in as much detail as possible trying to include the 
feelings, thoughts, and emotions that were present at the time. Please try your best to re­
experience the emotions involved. Don't worry about spelling, sentence structure, or 
grammar.
THANK-YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION. 
Please go to the next page
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Appendix 6
Normality tests and plots for excluded data: Self-Views
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotions
Self-esteem
Of all those excluded {n = 46) self-esteem scores were normally distributed. (D(46) = .107, p 
= .20). Figure 3 also demonstrates this normal distribution.
RSEJtotal mean
ST 4-
3.00.00 50 2.00
Mean *1.60 
Std. Dev. = .602 
hi = 4G
RSE_total_mean
Figure 3. Histogram (with normal curve) of RSE scores of all those excluded from the study.
Of those excluded, 19 were first person questionnaires. The RSE scores of these individuals 
were normally distributed (D (19) = .17, p = .14). Figures 4a and 4b depict this.
RSE total m ean
RSE_total_mean
Normal Q-Q Plot of RSE_total_mean 
for Perspective- 1st Person
O bserved Value
Figure 4 (a) Histogram (with normal curve) or Figure 4(b) Q-Q Plots of RSE scores of
RSE scores of the first-person perspective excluded first-person questionnaires,
questionnaires who were excluded.
Of those excluded that were third-person questionnaires {n = 27), distribution of self-esteem 
scores appeared to not significantly deviate from the normal distribution (D (27) = .09, p = 
.20). Figure 5a and 5b depict this.
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RSE_total_mean
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£
RSE_total_mean
Figure 5 (a) Histogram (with normal curve) or 
RSE scores of the third-person perspective 
questionnaires who were excluded.
Normal Q-Q Plot of RSE„totaI„mean
for Perspective- 3rd Person
1
z
I
O b serv ed  Value
Figure 5(b) Q-Q Plots of RSE scores of 
excluded third-person questionnaires.
Self-esteem scores of those excluded because they failed to take the required perspective 
(first-person n = 19, third-person n = 22) appeared approximately normal in both the first and 
third-person conditions respectively (D(19) = .17, p = .14), D(22) = .10, p =.20). this is 
depicted in Figure 6.
5
3-£
2.00 2.50 3.001.501.00
RSE totalm ean
Figure 6. Histogram with normal curve of self-esteem scores of individuals excluded because 
they failed to take the required first or third-person visual perspective.
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Shame proneness
Shame proneness scores of all excluded participants were approximately normally distributed 
(D (46) = .087, p = .20). Figure 7 also depicts this.
SSA_total_m ean
I
5 0 1.00 1 5 0 2.50
SSA_total_mean
Figure 7. Histogram (with normal curve) of shame-proneness scores of all excluded 
participants.
Of those excluded that were first-person questionnaires {n = 19), distribution of shame 
proneness scores appeared to not significantly deviate from the normal distribution (D (19) 
.12, p = .20). Figure 8a and 8b depict this.
SSA total mean
I
Mean * 1.46 
Std. Dev. * 585
Normal Q-Q Plot of SSA_total_mean 
foi Perspective- 1st Person
S SA to ta lm ean O bserved  Value
Figure 8 (a) Histogram (with normal curve) of 
shame proneness (SSA) scores of the first- 
person perspective questionnaires who were 
excluded.
Figure 8(b) Q-Q Plots of shame proneness 
(SSA) scores of excluded first-person 
questionnaires.
Of those excluded that were third-person questionnaires (n = 27), distribution of shame 
proneness scores appeared to not significantly deviate from the normal distribution (D(27) = 
.12, p = .20). Figures 9a and 9b depict this.
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Normal Q-Q Plot of SSA„total_mean
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Figure 9 (a) Histogram (with normal curve) of Figure 9(b) Q-Q Plots of shame proneness
shame proneness (SSA) scores of the third- 
person perspective questionnaires who were 
excluded.
(SSA) scores of excluded third-person 
questionnaires.
Of those excluded because they failed to take the required perspective, shame-proneness 
scores appeared approximately normal from both the first and third-person perspectives 
respectively (D(19) = .12, p = .20), (D(22) = .10, p = .20). See Figure 10.
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i
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Figure 10. Histogram (with normal curve) of shame proneness scores of individuals excluded 
because they failed to take the required first or third-person perspective.
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Self-compassion
Self-compassion scores of all excluded participants were approximately normally distributed 
(D (46) = .10, p = .20). See Figure 11.
SCS total m ean
SCS_total_mean
Figure 11. Histogram (with normal curve) of self-compassion scores of those excluded.
Of those excluded that were first-person questionnaires (n = 19), distribution of self­
compassion scores appeared to not significantly deviate from the normal distribution (D (19) 
.17, p  = .15). Figure 12a and 12b depict this.
SCS total mean
SCS_total_mean
Mean ■ 2.66 
Std. D*v. -  .631
Figure 12 (a) Histogram (with normal curve) of 
self-compassion (SCS) scores of the first-person 
perspective questionnaires who were excluded.
Normal Q-Q Plot of SCS_totaI_mean 
for Perspective- 1st Person
O bserved  Value
Figure 12(b) Q-Q Plots of self­
compassion (SCS) scores of excluded 
first-person questionnaires.
Of those excluded that were third-person questionnaires {n = 27), distribution of self­
compassion scores appeared to not significantly deviate from the normal distribution (D (27) = 
.11, p = .20). See Figure 13a and 13b.
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Figure 13 (a) self-compassion (SCS) scores of the 
third-person perspective questionnaires who were 
excluded.
Figure 13(b) Q-Q Plots of self­
compassion (SCS) scores of excluded 
third-person questionnaires.
Of those excluded because they failed to take the required perspective self-compassion scores 
appeared approximately normal from both the first and third-person perspectives respectively 
(D (19) = .17, p  = .15), (D(22) - .16, p = .13). See Figure 14.
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Figure 14. Histogram (with normal curve) of self-compassion scores of participants 
excluded because they failed to take the required first or -third person perspective.
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Appendix 7 
Normality tests and plots: Memory Age
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotions
The age of memory (in months) was significantly not normal as indicated by tests reported in the 
text, and the distribution of responses seen in Figure 15a and 15b below. In both instances, 
memory age waspostiively skeweed such that more recent memories were often recalled.
Memory_Age
Perspective: First
Mean = 8.84 
Std. Dev. = 12.269 
N = 73
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5c013w
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Figure 15a. Historgram (with normal curve) of reported age of memory (in months) in the first- 
person perspective gorup.
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Figure 15b. Historgram (with normal curve) of reported age of memory (in months) in the third-
person perspective gorup.
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Appendix 8
Memory Coding System
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Coding system of failure images used in the present study
1. Moral -  participants suggest that they have failed according to their own/ societies 
imposed moral or ethical standard. Standards or values might include not harming 
others or themselves.
2. Academic -  participants recall a time they feel that they have felt in their academic 
achievement or performance, e.g. participants recall a memory that pertains to 
failing an exam, or feeling as though they had performed badly in an exam, such as 
A-levels, GCSE’s. Academic failure also includes failing to get into a university of 
their choice, and a memory indicating a poor academic performance.
3. Skill - participants recall failing in a role or at a skill-based activity such a dance, 
drama, musical performance, driving or sporting activities.
4. Relationship/ social failure -  the failure memory is focused on the participant 
feeling as though they have failed themselves or another in their relationship to 
them, for example letting another down, failing to enter a relationship with a 
desired other...
5. Body image -  participants report memories and images that pertain to feeling a 
sense of failure in their own body image or looks.
6. Unknown -  participants have left this section blank, or have written few words or 
no enough information so that the memory cannot be clearly defined.
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Appendix 9
Normality tests and plots for group characteristics: Self-Views
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotions
Shame proneness.
Distribution of shame proneness (SSA) scores did not significantly differ from the normal 
distribution in the first (D (76) = .09,/? = .19) or third-person visual perspective (D (80) = .07, 
p  = .20). See Figure 16a and 16b.
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Figure 7 ^ .Histogram (with normal curve) of shame proneness responses in the first- 
person perspective group.
SSA_Total_MEAN 
Perspective: Third
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Figure 16b. Histogram (with normal curve) of shame proneness responses in the third-
person perspective group.
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Self-Compassion.
Data distribution of mean SCS scores did not significantly differ from the normal distribution 
in the first (D (76) = .09,/? = .20) or third-person visual perspective (Z) (80) = .07,/? = .20).
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Figure 17a. Histogram (with normal curve) o f self-compassion responses in the first- 
person perspective group.
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Figure 17b. Histogram (with normal curve) o f self-compassion responses in the third-person
perspective group.
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Self-esteem.
Distribution of mean RSE scores was shown to significantly differ from the normal 
distribution in the first-person visual perspective (Z) (76) = .10,/? = .04) but on reviewing the 
histogram (Figure 18), P-P (Figure 19) and Q-Q plots (Figure 20) it was decided that this 
approximately normal. The distribution of mean RSE scores in the third-person visual 
perspective was normal (D (80) = .01, p  = .20) (see Figure 21).
RSE_Total_MEAN
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20- Mean = 1.62 
Std. Dev. = .527 
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Figure 18. Histogram (with normal curve) of self-esteem scores in the first-person visual 
perspective group.
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Figure 19. P-P plot of self-esteem scores in the first-person visual perspective group.
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Figure 20. Q-Q Plot of self-esteem scores in the first-person visual perspective group.
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Figure 21. Histogram (with normal curve) of self-esteem scores in the third-person visual
perspective group.
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Distribution of dependent variables between groups: State shame and negative affect
scores.
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotions
Negative Affect (NA)
NA scores were normally distributed in both the first (D(76) = .09, p = .20) and third-person 
perspective groups (D(80) = .08, p = .20). See Figure 22a and 22b respectively.
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Figure 22a. Histogram (with normal curve) of negative affect scores in the first-person 
perspective group.
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Figure 22b. Histogram (with normal curve) of negative affect scores in the third-person
perspective group.
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State Shame (SSGS Shame)
State shame scores were normally distributed in the third-person visual perspective (D(80) = .08, p 
= .20), see Figure 26.. In the first-person visual perspective, state shame scores were shown to 
significantly deviate from the normal distribution on one test of normality (D (76) = .11, p = .03). 
However, a histogram (Figure 23) P-P plot (Figure 24) and Q-Q plots (Figure 25) indicate that the 
distribution of this variable is approximately normal.
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Figure 23. Histogram (with normal curve) of state shame scores in the first-person 
perspective group.
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Figure 24. P-P plot of state shame scores in the first-person perspective group.
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Figure 25. Q-Q plot o f state shame in the first-person perspective group.
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Figure 26. Histogram (with normal curve) o f state shame scores in the third-person
perspective group.
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Evidence that assumptions of the GLM have been met.
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotions
Self-esteem
Self-esteem with state shame as the dependent variable
• Homogeneity of variances
o Levene’s test is not significant: F (1, 154) = .268, p = .605
• Plot of residuals - Plot of residuals shows no pattern in distribution (Figure 27).
D ependent Variable: SSG S_Sham e
~ ° O
Observed Predicted Std. Residual
M odel: Intercept +  Perspective + RS E_Tota l_M EAN  +  R S E _Tota l_M EAN
Figure 27. Predicted * standardised residuals plot of state shame.
• Normality of residual distribution
o Histogram of residuals appears to approximate a normal distribution (see Figure 
28).
Histogram
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Standardized Residual for SSGS Shame
Figure 28. Histogram (with normal curve) of standardised residuals of state shame.
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• No influential outliers
o Cooks distances. No value is greater than 1 (see Figure 29).
Mean = .01 
Std. Dev. -  S 11 
M = 156
.00 4 2  .04
Cook's D istance for SSG S Shame
Figure 29. Histogram of Cook’s distances for state shame indicating that no value is greater than 
1.
Self-esteem, with Negative Affect as the dependent variable.
• Homogeneity of variances
o Levene’s test is not significant F (1,154) = .079, p = .779 
o Plot of residuals. Plot of residuals shows no pattern in distribution (Figure 30).
Dependent Variable: NA_PANAS
/
Observed Predicted Std. Residual
Model: Intercept +  P erspective  +  RSE_Total_M EA N +  RSE_Total_M EA N
Figure 30. Predicted * standardised residuals plot of negative affect.
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• Normality of residual distribution
o Histogram of residuals appears to approximate a normal distribution (see Figure 
31).
Histogram
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Std. Dev. = .93 
N = 156
u  15-
■2.00 .00 2.00 4.00
Standardized Residual for NA_PANAS
Figure 31. Histogram (with normal curve) of standardised residuals of negative affect. 
• No influential outliers
o Cooks distances. No value is greater than 1 (see Figure 32).
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Figure 32. Histogram of Cook’s distances indicating htat no value is greater than 1.
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Self-compassion 
Self-compassion, with state shame as the dependent variable
• Homogeneity of variances
o Levene’s test is not significant: F (1,154) = .124, p = .725 
o Plot of residuals. Plot of residuals shows no pattern in distribution (Figure 33).
Dependent Variable: SSGS_Shame
0
0
Observed Predicted Std. Residual
M odel: In tercep t +  P ersp e c tiv e  +  SC S_T otal_M E A N  +  SC S_Total_M EA N
Figure 33. Predicted * standardised residuals plot of state shame.
• Normality of residual distribution
o Histogram of residuals appears to approximate a normal distribution (see Figure 
34).
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Figure 34. Histogram (with normal curve) of standardised residuals of state shame. 
• No influential outliers
o Cooks distances. No value is greater than 1 (see Figure 35).
Mean -  .01 
a d .  Dev. = 1109 
N = 15E
Cook's Distance for SSGS_Shame
Figure 35. Histogram of Cook’s distances for state shame indicating that no value is greater 
than 1.
Self-compassion, with Negative Affect (NA) as the dependent variable
• Homogeneity of variances
o Levene’s test is not significant: F (1,154) = 1.51, p = 221
• Plot of residuals - Plot of residuals shows no pattern in distribution (Figure 36).
Dependent Variable: NA_PANAS
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Observed Predicted Std. Residual
Model: Intercept +  Perspective +  SCS_Total_M EAN +  SCS_Total_M EAN
Figure 36. Predicted * standardised residuals plot of negative affect.
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• Normality of residual distribution
o Histogram of residuals appears to approximate a normal distribution (see Figure 
37).
Histogram
o 15-
n
Standardized Residual for NA_PANAS
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N = 156
Figure 37. Histogram (with normal curve) of standardised residuals of negative affect. 
• No influential outliers
o Cooks distances. No value is greater than 1 (see Figure 38).
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Figure 38. Histogram of Cook’s distances for negative affect indicating that no value is greater 
than 1.
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Shame proneness 
Shame-proneness, with state shame as the dependent variable
• Homogeneity of variances
o Levene’s test is not significant: F (1,154) = 1.66, p = .198
• Plot of residuals - Plot of residuals shows no pattern in distribution (see Figure 39).
Dependent Variable: SSGS_Shame
Observed Predicted Std. Residual
Model: Intercept +  P ersp e c tiv e  +  SSA _T otal_M EA N  +  SSA _T otal_M EA N
Figure 39, Predicted * standardised residuals plot of state shame.
• Normality of residual distribution
o Histogram of standardised residuals appears to approximate a normal distribution 
(see Figure 40).
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Figure 40. Histogram (with normal curve) of standardised residuals of state shame.
• No influential outliers
o Cooks distances. No value is greater than 1 (see Figure 41).
Std. Dev. = HOB 
N = 156
Figure 4L Histogram of Cook’s distances indicating that no value is greater than 1.
Shame proneness with Negative Affect as the dependent variable
• Homogeneity of variances
o Levene’s test is not significant: F (1,154) = 2.05, p = .154
• Plot of residuals - Plot of residuals shows no pattern in distribution (see Figure 42).
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Figure 42. Predicted * standardised residuals plot of negative affect.
• Normality of residual distribution
o Histogram of standardised residuals appears to approximate a normal distribution
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Figure 43. Histogram (with normal curve) of standardised residuals of negative affect. 
• No influential outliers
o Cooks distances. No value is greater than 1.(Figure 44).
Mean = .01 
Std. Dev. = .01: 
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Figure 44. Histogram of Cook’s distances indicating that no value is greater than 1.
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Appendix 12
Main effects of self-views and perspective from the GLM Model including the
interaction term
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Table 6
Prediction of State Shame and Negative Affect by Self-views
Dependent
Variable Predicted by F a P Partial t f B Lower Upper
State Shame RSE 61.68 <001 .29 -5.99 -7.95 -4.03
State Shame SCS 49.77 <001 .25 -5.17 -7.22 -3.13
State Shame SSA 88.09 <001 .37 5.23 3.46 6.99
Negative Affect RSE 18.13 <001 .11 -6.25 -9.84 -2.67
Negative Affect SCS 10.93 .001 .07 -3.68 -7.40 0.03
Negative Affect SSA 35.48 <001 .19 6.04 2.77 5.68
Note. RSE = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, SCS = Self-Compassion Scale, SSA = Shame Scale for Adolescents. 
adf= 1,152
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MRP Proposal
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotional responses in young
people.
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotions
Background and rationale
Mental imagery can be defined as mental representations of visual objects which 
are no longer present but held in mind (Holmes & Matthews, 2010). This imagery has 
been associated to affective response, such that modifying these mental images can result 
in a change in emotion (Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985). One means of modifying 
mental imagery is the visual perspective with which an image is viewed. The perspective 
or visual viewpoint taken when viewing mental images such as memories, can take one of 
two forms (Nigro & Neisser, 1983). The first-person perspective means that a person is 
experiencing the image through their own eyes as they would in everyday life. A third- 
person perspective means an image is being viewed with the person as a subject of a 
scene, as if watching themselves on a videotape.
There are conflicting claims of the role of first-person and third-person 
perspectives in imagery on emotion. A systematic review of this literature can be seen in 
Appendix 9. Accounting for these contradictions, Libby and Eibach (2011) move away 
from the assumption that the perspective taken will directly predict the intensity of the 
emotional response. Instead, they posit that the visual perspective taken will influence the 
way in which people understand an event. Specifically, when people view a mental image 
from the third-person perspective, an individual understands this event in terms of its 
meaning in the broader context of their lives, or general self-theories. When people view 
an event from the first-person perspective, an individual understands this event in terms of 
the concrete details of the event itself. The third-person perspective provides an 
opportunity for idiosyncratic stable self-theories to interact with the understanding of an 
event, and the third-person perspective of imagery will intensify negative emotion only 
when these self-theories suggest a more threatening interpretation of the event.
Libby, Valenti, Pfent and Eibach (2011) evidence this by measuring trait self­
esteem, and asking participants to view a failure memory from either the first or third- 
person perspective. Picturing the failure event from the third rather than first-person
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotions 103
perspective reduced feelings of shame in individuals with high self-esteem -  whose self- 
beliefs encourage nonthreatening interpretations of failure. However, individuals with low 
self-esteem experienced more shame as a result of failure imagery when picturing the 
event from the third rather than first-person perspective, because the third-person 
perspective encouraged the negative interpretations of failure consistent with the self-view 
in low self-esteem.
Therefore, Libby et al (2011) evidence that the third-person perspective will reduce 
negative emotion from a negative event, when an individual’s self-theory suggests a more 
promising interpretation of the event. One such trait, not considered by Libby et al (2011) 
is that of self-compassion. Self-compassion is understood as being kind and non- 
judgemental to oneself in instances of failure, framing one’s own experiences as part of 
the larger human experience, desiring the selfs well-being and holding painful feelings in 
mindful awareness (Neff, Hseih & Dejitthirat, 2005). It is discreet from self-esteem 
(Leary, Tate, Allen, Adams & Hancock, 2007) but having both high self-esteem and high 
self-compassion may diminish negative emotions resulting from failure (Neff et al, 2005; 
Leary et al, 2007). It is also considered that this self-reflective process of self-compassion 
requires taking the stance of an “ other” towards oneself (Neff et al, 2005) consistent with 
taking a third-person perspective in visual imagery. Therefore, using a third-person 
perspective when imagining a failure will be more conducive to self-compassion than a 
first-person perspective.
The research of Libby et al (2011) also neglected to account for the specific type of 
behaviour; failure as a result of an action, or a failure to act (inaction). This difference in 
the type of behaviour has been found to play a role in the emotions resulting from 
different imagery perspectives (Valenti, Libby & Eibach, 2011). Valenti et al (2011) found 
that more regret and negative affect is experienced for inactions (not asking out a love 
interest when the opportunity arose) when pictured from the third-person perspective, 
whereas the opposite pattern was found for actions (being rejected by a love interest).
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To conclude, visual perspective in imagery influences how people understand 
pictured events (Libby & Eibach, 2011). Different self-theories can interact with this 
interpretation of the same objective event (e.g. self-esteem, Libby et al, 2011; self­
compassion, Leary et al, 2007), and differences in the meaning of failure events in relation 
to oneself may be determined by differences in the nature of the events themselves (e.g. 
action or inaction, Valenti et al, 2011). A study that can account for individual self­
theories when examining imagery perspective would give a more comprehensive 
understanding of how these factors interact to predict negative emotions. Such research in 
adolescence may not only emphasise which self-theories foster resilience to failure events, 
but also identify which factors account for emotional variance and thus provide greater 
insight into the mechanisms of negative imagery in young people.
Research question
1) What is the impact of self-esteem, self-compassion and shame-proneness on the 
relationship between imagery perspective of a memory of failure and negative 
emotion in young people?
Main hypotheses
1. Self-esteem will determine the effect of perspective on shame and negative affect
a. Lower self-esteem predicts more shame and negative affect, only when the 
failure pictured from the third-person perspective, not the first.
2. Self-compassion will determine the effect of perspective on shame and negative 
affect
a. Lower self-compassion predicts more negative affect and shame when the 
failure is pictured from third-person perspective, than the first.
3. Shame-proneness will predict event-shame.
a. Those more shame-prone will experience greater event-specific shame 
resulting from failure imagery.
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Method 
Participants
Participants will be aged 16-18 years. The sample size was estimated using G- 
Power (Paul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Analyses were entered for each 
hypotheses; the largest sample size emerged for hypothesis 2 and 3, which utilise a linear 
multiple regression, with “perspective” and “self-esteem” or “self-compassion” entered as 
predictor variables. A total sample size of 88 is required to detect an effect (Power = 0.9, 
effect size f2 = 0.15). This gives 44 participants per condition; first-person and third- 
person perspective. The medium effect size is a modest estimate from previous research in 
this field (e.g. Libby et al, 2011).
Participants will be included in the study if  they are between the ages of 16-18 
years old. Exclusion of participants in the analyses will be: if their response to perspective 
manipulation check is “no”; if content check of memory demonstrates the task had not 
been taken seriously; if vividness measure reveals they have not formed a clear image (i.e. 
scores of 5).
Although no data is available on response rates, a conservative estimate of 10% 
predicts that 978 students will need to be approached. This allows for 10% response rate, 
and a predicted 90% estimated sample who pass manipulation checks (e.g. Valenti et al, 
2011, 94%; Libby et al, 2011, 82%), leaving 88 respondents. Therefore, the minimum 
number to target is 978, concordant with student population numbers in the colleges 
agreed.
Participants will be recruited from educational establishments for 16-18 year olds, 
with provisional interest currently attained from 2 colleges in Hampshire, with a sum of 
approximately 1500 16-18 year old students.
Design
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The present research will employ a randomised experimental design. The effect of 
the main predictor (perspective, with 2 conditions; first-person; third-person), on the 
outcome variables of negative emotion will be explored with a number of covariates.
Measures (Appendix 1)
Rosenberg Self-esteem scale (RSE, Rosenberg, 1965). This scale consists of 10 
items measuring global self-esteem rated on a likert scale from 0 (not at all) to 3 (nearly 
everyday).The five negatively-worded items are reverse coded and the sum of all items 
create an overall level of self-esteem, with higher scores representing higher levels of self­
esteem. The RSE is suitable for adolescence as it was originally developed for self-esteem 
assessment in this population. It has shown good reliability and validity with Cronbachs 
alphas of .74 and .77 (McCarthy & Hoge, 1982) and .89 (Hagborg, 1993). Convergent 
validity has been investigated and the measure was found to have high correlations with 
other measures of self-esteem (Hagborg, 1993).
Self-compassion Scale (SCS; Neff, 2003). This measure is made up of 26 items 
rated using a likert scale ranging from 1 (almost never) to 5 (almost always). The 26 items 
make up five subscales of self-kindness, common humanity and mindfulness, self­
judgement, isolation and over-identification. Negative items are reverse coded and all 26 
items summed together to make a total self-compassion score. Higher scores represent 
higher levels of self-compassion.
The SCS has good construct validity, being significantly correlated with other scales that 
measure similar constructs (Neff, 2003). The SCS has also been shown to demonstrate 
good reliability with a Cronbach alpha of .92 (Neff & Vonk, 2009). Similar levels of 
reliability have been show in adolescents, with an alpha of .09 (Neff & McGehee, 2010). 
Despite this, some words were adapted for the present sample, reducing assumptions of 
word knowledge, e.g. “inadequacy” to “feeling not good enough”.
Shame-proneness: Shame Scale for adolescence (SSA; John, Simonds, Chester 
& Taylor, in prep.). The SSA is a 19 item measure in which participants are asked to
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think of their own experiences of when they have felt shame and think of these when 
rating the 19 items on a likert-type scale of statements ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 (a 
lot). The scale makes up three factors of shame: negative evaluation of self (10 items), 
outward expression (4 items) and internalised affect (5 items). Higher scores indicate 
greater shame propensity. John et al (in prep.) demonstrated good internal consistency 
with an overall Cronbach’s alpha of 0.93, and good content, criterion and construct 
validity.
Manipulation checks (see full protocol, Appendix 4).
i. Perspective. Use of visual perspective can be checked using the method utilised 
in Libby et al (2011). Participants respond yes or no to the question {third-person 
condition in italics), “as you’re picturing it right now, do you see the situation from the 
visual perspective [you had/ an outsider would have had] when the situation was 
originally happening?”.
ii. Content checks. Participants record a few details of the memory in the space 
provided.
Hi. Memory vividness. Memory vividness is measured by asking participants to 
respond to the question “how vivid is the image?” (Marks, 1973). Responses range along a 
likert scale from 1 (perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision) to 5 (no image at all).
Negative affect: Positive Affect-Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson, 
Clark & Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS is based on a 2-factor model of affect, which 
posits that Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA) are independent dimensions. 
Respondents rate on a 5-point Likert-type scale the extent to which they feel at this present 
moment, each of 10 positive and 10 negative affective states. Responses are summed 
separately for PA and NA, each with a possible score of 10 to 50. The PANAS has been 
shown to be valid and reliable in adolescent samples (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988).
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Current regret: Regret scale. Valenti et al, 2011. The word “regretful” is 
appended to the end of the PANAS. The emotion is rated in the same way as the other 
words in the PANAS.
Previously felt regret. Valenti et al, 2011. Participants rate the regret they have 
previously felt for that experience of failure, on a likert-type scale, as used in the PANAS.
State shame: State Shame and Guilt Scale (SSGS; Marschall, Sanftner & 
Tangney, 1994). The SSGS is a 15-itme measure, with 3 subscales, “shame”, “guilt” and 
“pride”. Each subscale has 5 items, which are responded to along a likert scale indicating 
to what extent they are feeling the stated way at the present moment (1-5), as they 
experience the image. Each subscale has an inter-item reliability of .89 (Marschall et al, 
1994).
Procedure
Recruitment. A confirmation of favourable ethical opinion will be presented to 
the heard of year/ college. Additional colleges may be approached using the letter seen in 
Appendix 2.
a. The researcher will meet this senior staff member, explain the details of the study 
and request consent to recruit.
b. There are four proposed means of data collection:
i. Tutors announce the times and days the study will take place. A room is set 
aside for the researcher within the college e.g. in the lunch hour. Students can 
complete the study online or on paper.
ii. Tutors allow the researcher 30 minutes of lesson time. Students who do not 
wish to participate are invited to opt out.
iii. The researcher introduces the study and students willing to participate may 
give their email addresses to the researcher. The researcher then emails all 
interested parties a link to an online version of the study (see Appendix 3).
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iv. The college agrees to send a link to the online version of the study through 
their email system to students (see Appendix 3).
Participant procedure (a full protocol can be seen in Appendix 4).
1. Participants aged 16-18 years given information on study (Appendix 5) and 
consent to participate (Appendix 6).
2. Participants are asked their age and gender.
3. Participants complete self-esteem, shame-proneness and self-compassion measures 
(self-compassion measure is counterbalanced (random assignment) before and 
after imagery task to account for order effects).
4. Imagery task
a. Memory recall: Participants are asked to recall a time when they experienced 
failure.
b. Perspective manipulation: Participants are randomly assigned, asked to recall 
from either first or third-person perspective.
i. First/ Third: “You should use the first-person visual perspective to 
picture the situation. With the first-person visual perspective you see the 
situation from the same visual perspective [you/ an outsider would have] 
had when the situation originally took place. That is, [you are looking 
out at your surroundings through your own eyes/ you see yourself as well 
as your surroundings in the image.”
5. Manipulation checks.
6. Participants complete the outcome measures:
a. Event-Shame
b. Negative affect, including the measure of regret.
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7. At the end of the session, participants provide additional information about the 
event and themselves. They are asked to categorise the failure experience (e.g. 
academic failure) and record the month and year in which the memory happened. 
They are also asked to record if the failure experience was an action or an inaction, 
and rate previously felt regret for this experience.
8. To counteract any negative effects of recalling an experience of failure, the 
questionnaire will end with a prompt asking participants to recall a personal 
achievement.
9. Self-compassion measure (50% of the sample complete this measure here to 
counterbalance).
10. Debrief (see Appendix 7).
Ethical considerations
The following table highlights the ethical considerations and how they are proposed to be 
addressed:
Ethical consideration Addressed by
Young people as a sample
Head of year/ college consent received in 
addition to student consent.
Option to end participation at any point
Recall of personal memories Data anonymised and stored securely
Recalling a “failure” memory, and 
accessing negative emotions may leave 
participants with these emotions.
Before leaving the study participants are 
asked to recall a personal achievement.
Participants are encouraged to talk to form 
tutor if any concerns persist following the 
study.
Researcher contact details given for further
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questions.
Use of college facilities and teacher time
Input offered to colleges from the 
researcher e.g. a presentation on “Careers in 
psychology”
Proposed data analysis
The initial descriptive analysis will reveal the sample demographics. Any relevant factors 
that are statistically significant between groups, will be controlled for in further analyses 
(e.g. age, gender, age of memory, vividness of memory).
The next step in the analysis will determine if any of the independent variables have an 
effect on emotion (the outcome variables). According to Field (2009) a MANCOVA will 
fulfil this role with perspective, entered as an independent variable and the dependent 
variables as event-shame, negative affect and regret. Type of behaviour, shame-proneness, 
self-esteem and self-compassion will be covariates.
Once an effect of the measured predictor variables on the outcome variables is established, 
the key hypotheses will be tested as follows:
Hypotheses Analysis
1. It is expected that lower self-esteem 
will be associated to greater shame 
and negative affect, only when 
participants picture failure from the 
third-person perspective, not the 
first.
The outcome variables of shame and 
negative affect will be submitted to a linear 
regression model with perspective, self­
esteem and their interactions as predictors.
2. It is expected that lower self­
compassion will be associated to
The outcome variables of shame and 
negative affect will be submitted to a linear
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greater shame and negative affect 
than those higher on self­
compassion, only when participants 
picture failure from the third-person 
perspective, not the first.
regression model with perspective, self­
compassion and their interactions as 
predictors.
3. Those more shame-prone will 
experience greater event shame 
resulting from the failure imagery 
task.
Shame-proneness and event-shame will be 
entered into a correlation. A positive 
correlation between these two variables will 
indicate this relationship.
Service user/ carer involvement
Service users and carers were not consulted in the development of this proposal, because 
the intended participants are non-clinical adolescents. Instead, three adolescents (aged 16- 
18 years) were consulted with the protocol in Appendix 4. Their feedback highlighted no 
areas for editing, and that the concepts had been understood.
Feasibility issues
Potential obstacle Solution
Initial colleges retract interest Further colleges to be approached
Poor response rate
Additional colleges to be approached, and 
two means of data collection (online and on 
paper)
Students are disinterested in participation Benefits of participation reported in 
information sheet.
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Dissemination
Plans for dissemination include presentation at course conference in 2014, and potentially 
at BABCP UK and Europe and DCP or Child Faculty conference. Results will also be 
shared with authors of measures used as requested by authors.
Study timeline
A full timeline in the format of a Gantt chart can be seen in Appendix 8.
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Abstract
Visual imagery perspective has been considered to play a role in emotional responses to 
imagery for over 30 years. However, the role of the differing visual perspectives -  third- 
person, versus first-person, still remains unclear. A first-person visual perspective is when 
an individual imagines a scene through their own eyes, whereas a third-person visual 
perspective is when an individual imagines themselves in a scene from an observer 
perspective, as if watching oneself in a film (Nigro & Neisser, 1983). A number of 
databases were searched, and this systematic review explores the 42 articles found. Visual 
imagery perspective appears to play a role as both a consequence of emotional content of 
memory and imagery, and a cause of emotional responses to imagery and memories. The 
view that third-person visual perspective serves to dampen an emotional response 
(Robinson & Swanson, 1993) to imagery, appears outdated given the current evidence, 
and more complex models allowing for moderators of appraisals, and a number of 
individual differences appear give a better understanding of the role of visual perspective 
in imagery and emotion.
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Introduction 
Imagery and emotion
Mental imagery can be defined as mental representations of visual objects which 
are no longer present, but are held in mind as neural representations constructed from 
more elementary sensory information (Holmes & Matthews, 2010). This imagery has been 
emphasised by cognitive therapy. Beck (1976) posited that mental activity can take the 
form of words, or images, which can be linked to affective response; thus modifying these 
mental images can result in a change in emotion (Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985). This 
modification, or imagery rescripting is used in CBT treatments for many clinical 
presentations, including social anxiety and PTSD (Hirsch & Holmes, 2007; Amtz, Tiesma 
& Kindt, 2007). Indeed, Holmes and Matthews (2005) demonstrated that mental imagery 
can cause more intense feelings of anxiety than verbal processing of this same material. It 
therefore seems that mental imagery has a clear and powerful association with emotions, 
and a growth in interest of the clinical applications of imagery in therapeutic interventions 
has been seen in recent years (Holmes, Amtz & Smucker, 2007).
Imagery and perspective
The perspective, or visual viewpoint taken when viewing mental images, such as 
memories, can take one of two forms (Nigro & Neisser, 1983). The first-person, or field 
perspective, means that a person is experiencing the image through their own eyes as they 
would in everyday life. A third-person, or observer perspective, means an image is being 
viewed with the person as a subject of a scene, as if watching themselves on a videotape. 
This distinction is also not new to psychology, as the first-person perspective reflects the 
“I” where the self is the experiencer and the third-person perspective reflects the “me” 
where the self is an object (James, 1890,1950).
The perspective used in imagery can be changed at will (Robinson & Swanson, 
1993) and so is considered to be a mode of remembering, occurring with the construction 
of an image, rather than unique to the encoding of the image (Nigro & Neisser, 1983).
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This distinction between two different perspectives was originally explored as one aspect 
of the phenomenology of remembering (Robinson & Swanson, 1993), until more recent 
empirical research considered the role of perspective in the creation of future projections, 
or images (e.g. Holmes, Coughtrey & Connor, 2008). Visual perspective is therefore 
relevant to both visually relived memories and visual future projections. Research 
indicates that memories and future projections or images, share the same neural circuitry 
(Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2007). The present review will consider both as examples of 
visually represented mental events.
Imagery perspective and emotion
When evaluating the outcome of mental imagery, it is important to consider 
imagery perspective as one phenomenological aspect. Mental imagery can cause 
emotional responses, or conscious affective states, (Holmes & Matthews, 2005) and first- 
person and third-person perspectives appear to be differentially associated to emotion. For 
example, it is argued (Robinson & Swanson, 1993), that the first-person perspective is 
associated with greater emotion than the third-person perspective. As a result, a third- 
person visual imagery perspective has been advocated when working clinically with 
mental images, encouraging personal reliving of a distressing image (Hackmann, Bennet- 
Levy & Holmes, 2011). The mechanisms behind such associations will be explored in 
this paper. Recent evidence indicates that study of these mechanisms sheds new critical 
light on this direct view (Sutin & Robins, 2008; Libby & Eibach, 2011).
A systematic review of the literature is presented here to ascertain the evidence of 
the role of visual perspective in imagery and emotion. This evidence is evaluated to direct 
future research in this field.
Search Strategy
An electronic search of five databases was performed (PsychlNFO, Web of 
Knowledge, MEDLINE, COCHRANE, and CESTAHL), including all papers published up 
to January 2012. Titles, abstracts and keywords of papers were searched using the search
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terms: “imagery OR memor* OR daydream” AND “third-person perspective OR observer 
perspective OR first person perspective OR field perspective” AND “ emot*.” Any full 
English, peer reviewed paper was included. To provide breadth of understanding, all types 
of evidence were considered (e.g., exploratory, qualitative, case reports and experimental).
Two phases of exclusion applied (see Figure 1): from abstracts, and at full text. 
Papers excluded from their abstracts did not contain reference or explore the relationship 
between imagery, perspective and emotion, according to the definitions in the present 
introduction. Papers that fulfilled these criteria were again screened at full text, and only 
included if they demonstrated the role of or relationship between imagery perspective and 
emotion, either in autobiographical memories or in future projections.
The search resulted in 39 articles to be reviewed. A summary of these papers can be found 
in Appendix 1.
Search terms entered
i
93 English peer-reviewed papers 
t
Excluded at abstract = 42
I
Excluded at frill text =12 
n = 39
Figure 1. Search procedure.
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Results
A review of these 39 results reveals a transition in our understanding of the role of 
imagery perspective in emotion. The studies were found to contribute to or question one of 
three main hypotheses that emerged from the data, which organise the review; a third- 
person visual perspective in imagery dampens emotion (Robinson & Swanson, 1993), a 
third-person perspective is associated to either positive or negative affect depending on the 
appraisal processes (Sutin & Robins, 2008), and the third-person perspective causes and 
results in a person evaluating a mental event in the context of their life more broadly 
(Libby & Eibach, 2011).
Originating from one of the first experimental investigations of imagery 
perspective and emotion, is the proposal that third-person imagery perspective has a 
direct effect on the emotional impact of the image, such that viewing an image from the 
third-person reduces emotional responses compared with viewing an image from the first- 
person (Robinson & Swanson, 1993). However, this theory cannot account for findings 
when third-person perspective amplifies the emotional impact of imagery (Libby, Valenti, 
Pfent & Eibach, 2011), and indeed it seems that both theories appear to be true under 
different moderating conditions. The models of Libby and Eibach (2011) and Sutin and 
Robins (2008) both attempt to define the conditions under which third-person imagery 
perspective will result in an increased or decreased emotional response.
This more recent evidence suggests that imagery perspective does not directly 
determine the emotional impact of the event, but rather indirectly determines resulting 
emotions via the appraisal or construal of the event in relation to the self and a number of 
individual difference factors. This review comes from an acknowledgement that despite a 
growing body of literature in this field, there are absences in our understanding of the 
functions of these different perspectives, and the reasons why we adopt first-person or 
third-person perspectives (Leary, Estrada & Allen, 2009).
A direct role of perspective on emotions
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The visual perspective in imagery is the visual viewpoint taken in mental 
representations. Nigro and Neisser (1983) were among the first to conduct empirical 
studies of this phenomenological aspect of memory, and clearly demonstrated a distinction 
between these two perspectives. They found that by asking high-school students to recall 
memories, by reflecting on the concrete objective circumstances surrounding the 
remembered scenario, participants predominantly used a third-person perspective whereas 
the attempt to recall feelings in these events led to more first-person perspective 
memories. This provided the initial theory that the third-person perspective in imagery is 
associated to objective rather than emotional content of memories.
Further work by Robinson and Swanson (1993) asked participants to recall 8 
memories from their preferred perspective, and then two weeks later directed participants 
to shift their visual perspective for these memories. When participants shifted from a first 
to third-person perspective they found that the affect experienced whilst remembering 
significantly reduced. To explain this effect of the third-person perspective dampening 
emotion, they argue that the first-person perspective draws on affective information 
gleaned from experience, whereas the third-person perspective can only allow for affective 
information to be deduced from the cognitive details of an event, rather than emotional 
personal experience. Indeed, when participants shifted from third to first-person 
perspective for the same memory, there was no increase in affect, suggesting that the 
experiential code was unavailable, and the retrieval of the memory through third-person 
perspective relied on the limited cognitive coding to reconstruct affective information.
This experimental design allowed authors to posit that visual perspective may play a 
causal role in the emotional affect resulting from memories. However, this conclusion is 
made tentative by the confound that the age of the memory was a significant predictor of 
the perspective used to recall that memory -  with older memories being more likely to be 
recalled from a third-person perspective. This confound is supported by other authors 
(Nigro & Neisser, 1983; West & Bauer, 1999).
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Robinson and Swanson’s (1993) work became one of the first in a line of evidence 
supporting this claim that third-person imagery perspective directly determines the 
emotion experienced when imagining an event, in that it universally dampens the 
emotional reaction associated to the memory. Indeed, the predominant view is that the 
majority of emotionally-connected memories are imagined through the first-person 
perspective (Irish, Lawlor & O’Mara, 2008) and that recalling emotional events from the 
first-person perspective causes memories to be rated as more emotional, compared to the 
third-person perspective (Terry & Horton, 2007).
Supporting this claim, researchers began to include memory perspective as a 
phenomenological aspect of memory, in addition to other aspects of memory such as the 
distinction between remembering an event, and knowing that an event occurred. Crawley 
(2005) found that known events (based on parental accounts, and without the elements of 
personal experience) were more likely to be recalled from a third-person perspective than 
remembered events (personally recollected) and were also more likely to receive lower 
ratings of emotional content of the events. This demonstrates an association between a 
third-person perspective of a memory, and a reduced emotionality associated to this event. 
Confounding these findings, false memories are more likely to be recalled from a third- 
person perspective than true memories, and to contain less detail including emotional 
intensity (Heaps & Nash, 2001) which may serve as an alternative explanation of the 
association found by Crawley (2010), as “known” events are possibly false memories. 
Therefore this evidence supports Robinson and Swanson (1993) that a third-person 
perspective is associated to less emotion, but this could be an artefact of encoding (as false 
memories were never actually stored), rather than retrieval.
The weakness of many studies exploring autobiographical memories is therefore 
the unknown veracity of these memories (Heaps & Nash, 2001). Controlling for this, Eich, 
Nelson, Leghari and Handy (2009) asked participants to create a piece of art, or take a 
walk. Participants recalled these events from both perspectives one week later whilst 
under functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). Authors found that the first-person
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perspective at retrieval was associated with brain activation of interoceptive emotion- 
related areas (e.g. amygdala and somatosensory regions) more than the third-person 
perspective. These differences could not be explained by the rated emotionality of the 
memory itself, but were uniquely explained by the perspective taken. It thus seems that 
emotional brain areas are implicated in the use of first-person perspective, and this is not a 
result of the emotional appraisal of these events, but because a third-person perspective 
does not engage emotional neural circuits and could play a direct causal role in reducing 
the affective experience of memories. However, a cautious interpretation of these findings 
would consider the crossover in neural circuitry, such that the amygdala activation 
demonstrated was so posterior it could be considered part of the hippocampus, which is 
implicated in more general memory functioning. Replication of these findings would 
enhance the validity of the neural correlations.
The above work has led to a predominant view that a third-person perspective 
dampens the emotional response to a visual mental event (Robinson & Swanson, 1993). It 
seems possible that this association will occur, independent of the valence of the memory 
or event. To this end, D’Argembeau, Comblain and Van der Linden (2003) found that 
both positive and negative memories were associated with more first-person perspective 
than neutral memories. This suggests that regardless of valence, first-person perspective is 
associated to emotional memories. This evidence can also be regarded as supporting a 
direct role of visual perspective in imaging mental events on the affect experienced, such 
that a third-person perspective reduces emotional affect.
An indirect role of perspective on emotion: moderated by appraisals of the event
A number of studies have indicated that a third-person perspective can also 
amplify emotional memories (Terry & Barwick, 1998-1999). In an attempt to account for 
these opposing ideas that third-person perspective can both enhance or dampen emotion, 
Sutin and Robins (2008) provide two theories; the dispassionate observer view and the 
salient-self view. The dispassionate observer view predicts that a third-person perspective
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for autobiographical memories dampens emotional experience and distances the current 
self from the imagined self, whilst the salient-self view predicts that the third-person 
perspective amplifies the emotional experience, and will also strengthen the association 
between the past and current self. Importantly, this role of perspective is predicted to 
occur for autobiographical memories -  which are defined as episodic memories which 
have been appraised as relevant to the self (Sutin & Robins, 2008). As these memories are 
the result of a reconstructive process, the perspective taken in these memories is one 
phenomenological aspect of this process.
This memory retrieval process is influenced by two core self-motives, which serve 
as moderators, predicting which of the two opposing theories will result (see Figure 2). 
The appraisal of the image or memory in relation to the current “self’ determines the 
perspective used and the resulting impact on emotion. Self-motives of self-enhancement, 
and self-coherence are maintained by appraising the threat and congruence of the memory 
content to the current self respectively. In the dispassionate observer view, the third- 
person perspective reduces negative emotion when an appraisal of self-threat has been 
made, and also the third-person perspective serves to distance the imagined self from the 
current self, when an incongruence appraisal has been made. Thus, an individual pursues 
self-enhancement and self-coherence. In the salient-self view, when the content of an 
image is appraised as no threat to the self, for example if the image is associated to 
positive affect, the third-person perspective amplifies the emotional experience. In 
addition, if the content is evaluated as congruent to the current self view, then the third- 
person perspective strengthens connections between the current and past self, resulting in 
an increased feeling of authenticity and congruence.
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Figure 2. Sutin and Robins (2008) model of self-processes involved in the retrieval of 
autobiographical memories.
The motive for self-enhancement
A strong line of evidence exists demonstrating that negative, or traumatic 
memories are associated with the third-person imagery perspective. This supports Sutin 
and Robins (2008) because according to the dispassionate observer view, the third-person 
perspective is a strategy employed to dampen the emotional experience of negative 
images, and thus in the traumatic memory literature the third-person perspective is seen as 
a means of cognitive avoidance.
For example, Cooper, Yuille and Kennedy (2002) asked prostitutes to recall 
positive and traumatic memories. They found that prostitutes were more likely to retrieve 
memories through a third-person perspective for memories that were rated as more 
traumatic, and also to demonstrate greater dissociation for these memories. Cooper et al 
(2002) suggest that this indicates the third-person perspective is taken as a means of
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dampening and depersonalising the negative emotional aspects of the traumatic memory 
which threaten the self, supporting the “dispassionate observer” view.
In addition, in a sample of euthymie psychiatric nurses, Lemogne Bergouignan,
Piolino, Jouvent, Allilaire, and Fossati (2009) found that possessing a high cognitive 
avoidance trait predicts that negative autobiographical memories are more likely recalled 
from a third-person perspective. These memories were also more likely to be known rather 
than remembered, and authors argue this is evidence that the third-person perspective is 
preventing such traumatic memories from being fully relived at a conscious level. This 
association supports the dispassionate observer theory that a third-person perspective may 
be employed as a strategy of cognitive avoidance for negative memories.
However, when considering that worry is a form of cognitive avoidance serving to 
reduce feelings of anxiety (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky & DePree, 1983)
Finnbogadôttir and Bemsten (2011) failed to find support that high worriers, compared to 
low worriers, were more likely to use the third-person perspective when retrieving 
autobiographical memories and future projections. Therefore, authors were unable to fully 
support their hypothesis that high worriers use a third-person perspective as a means of 
cognitive avoidance. However, participants used a diary to record their recalled memories 
and projections, and because the events imagined were not controlled, high worriers may 
have recalled less central events as a means of cognitive avoidance. This was supported by 
their finding that high worriers were more likely to rate their memories and future 
projections as less self-relevant, but this cannot be inferred to provide evidence for Sutin 
and Robins (2008) explanation of the role of third-person perspective in memories.
The use of a third-person perspective as distancing oneself from emotional 
experience has been demonstrated to have positive applications. Crawley (2010) 
investigated the utility of the third-person perspective for participants who do not have 
closure -  defined as the resolution of a remembered experience. It was proposed that the 
emotional dampening effect of the third-person perspective could be applied to distressing
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotions
memories, such that they might be “closed” by repetition of memories from the third- 
person. Indeed, Crawley (2010) found that asking participants to recall their “open” 
memories on 3 occasions, induced closure (e.g. less emotional detail in the event). 
However, reduced emotional intensity and remembered negative emotion was an effect 
unique to a shift from recounting these memories in first-person perspective to recounting 
these memories from the third-person perspective. This suggests an adaptive function of 
the third-person perspective, in reducing the emotional impact of distressing memories. 
However, a follow-up period would be necessary to know about the long-term impact of 
this “closure”, and whether this simply served as a maladaptive cognitive avoidance.
The cognitive avoidance strategy of using a third-person perspective for negative 
memories has been explored as maladaptive in clinical populations, such as those with 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). It is understood that the maintenance of distress 
in PTSD is a result of insufficient processing of the traumatic memory (e.g. Foa, Steketee, 
& Rothbaum, 1989). However, characteristic of PTSD is the frequent cognitive reliving of 
the traumatic memory -  so why does this not serve to process the memory? It is argued 
that using the third-person perspective when reliving these memories may be a means of 
limiting the emotional processing of the mental event. For example, Mclsaac and Eich 
(2004) found a significant proportion (89%) of their PTSD sample who recalled their 
trauma from a third-person perspective reported doing so in an effort to avoid reliving the 
event through their own eyes. As a result, the memory is insufficiently processed, and 
PTSD symptomology is maintained.
In support of this, Kenny, Bryant, Silove, Creamer, O’Donnell and McFarlane 
(2009) took a large sample of PTSD sufferers, identified their natural perspective of the 
trauma within 4 weeks of it occurring, and again 12 months later. They found that 
individuals who initially reported a third-person perspective showed higher PTSD 
symptomology at baseline, and were over 2.5 times more likely to have PTSD symptoms 
12 months on, than those who had taken a first-person perspective previously. This 
demonstrates that when negative affect is high, a third-person perspective may be
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employed as a maladaptive avoidance strategy which simply serves to maintain the 
traumatic memories. Although such prospective designs usually allow us to infer 
causality, there appears to be a gap in the evidence that is filled by an assumption. It seems 
one is expected to assume that the third-person perspective results in a temporary 
reduction of distress relative to the first-person memory reliving, and as a result, PTSD 
symptomology is maintained. However, authors did not utilise a measure of distress 
associated to the memory, so cannot be certain that a third-person perspective did indeed 
limit emotional processing. Therefore although we can conclude that a third-person 
perspective is associated to greater PTSD symptomology, we cannot draw strong 
conclusions from this study about the mechanisms by which this occurred.
However, in support of Sutin and Robins’ (2008) proposal that a third-person 
perspective can be a means of emotional avoidance for negative memories, Williams and 
Moulds (2007) found that a third-person perspective was more associated with cognitive 
avoidance, dissociation and rumination in undergraduates scoring highly on depression 
measures. No such correlation existed in those who were not depressed. Furthermore, 
Kuyken and Moulds (2009) demonstrated in patients with a history of recurrent depression 
that over 76% of negative memories were retrieved using a third-person perspective and 
that 82% of positive memories were viewed from a first-person perspective. This could 
suggest people with depression use a third-person perspective for negative memories as an 
attempt to reduce the negative emotion resulting from ruminations. However, authors did 
not ask participants to rate the emotionality of the memories and so results are limited in 
their ability to support the dispassionate observer view.
In addition, Talarico, Bemsten and Rubin (2009) found that people recall more 
peripheral details of positive, than of negative memories, and expected that this was 
because a third-person perspective was taken to retrieve negative memories thus reducing 
the emotional detail recalled. However, the recall of peripheral details was not associated 
to perspective, which suggests it is not the valence or emotionality of an event that 
determines perspective, and contradicts Sutin and Robins (2008) model.
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotions
These findings are dependent on correlational designs, and provide limited support for the 
view that a third-person perspective of imagery may play a role in dampening the negative 
affect associated with negative memories or images. Furthermore, because authors were 
not explicitly attempting to demonstrate the validity of Sutin and Robins (2008) model, 
the findings here extrapolated to the model highlight the assumptions that may have been 
made by Sutin and Robins (2008) in using such research to support their model.
The motive for self-verfication
The second moderator proposed by Sutin and Robins (2008) is the appraisal of the 
image content as self-congruent. Images appraised as self-congruent are predicted by the 
salient-self view to be viewed from the third-person, as a means of amplifying similarities 
between the present and imagined self. The dispassionate observer view posits that images 
appraised as incongruent to the current self will be viewed through a third-person 
perspective, as a means of distancing the current self from the imagined self. Supporting 
the dispassionate observer view, Libby and Eibach (2002) determined that people tend to 
use the third-person perspective when visualising memories of behaviours that conflict 
with their current self view, and specifically, that participants whose current self-concept 
of “healthy eating” was activated, were more likely to recall past episodes of over- 
indulgence from a third-person perspective.
Cognitive-Affective crossfire
Sutin and Robins (2008) therefore provide two processes which moderate whether 
the dispassionate observer or the salient-self view will occur. However, there are events 
which may result in a conflict between the salient-self and the dispassionate observer 
view, as a result of a conflict between the two appraisal processes. For example, from a 
dispassionate observer perspective, a positive memory would be viewed from the first- 
person perspective. However, if this memory is incongruent with the current self, then the 
dispassionate observer predicts the third-person perspective will be taken to maintain self- 
consistency. Thus there becomes a conflict between the appraisals and the perspective that
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should be taken -  known as a cognitive-affective crossfire (Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & 
Gaines, 1987). It is proposed that the motive for self-consistency will take precedence, and 
in this case the third-person perspective will be used as a means of distancing the 
incongruent remembered self with current self. Lemogne, Piolino Friszer, Claret, Girault, 
Jouvent, et al (2006) demonstrated this with depressed patients, where the recollection of 
positive memories was more likely from a third-person perspective than non-depressed 
patients recalling positive memories.
Clinical implications of these results are difficult to draw because with a cross- 
sectional design we cannot determine whether adopting a third-person perspective is a 
cause or consequence of depression. However, the suggested findings are given further 
credence by studies that have found these effects in clinical samples in remission e.g. 
Bergouignan, Lemogne, Foucher, Longin, Vistoli, Allilaire et al (2008) where euthymie 
participants in remission were more likely to use the third-person perspective for positive 
memories than never depressed controls.
However, this cognitive-affective crossfire is not always evident as demonstrated 
in Wicso and Nolen-Hoeksema (2011) sample of both dysphoric and nondysphoric 
participants. Participants were asked to recall a sad event from either a first or third-person 
perspective. Although authors predicted that depression would moderate the emotional 
dampening effect of third-person perspective on emotion, they found that in both 
dysphoric and nondysphoric individuals, the negative memory was re-experienced less 
intensely from a third-person perspective compared to a first-person perspective. This 
stands against the cognitive-affective crossfire hypothesis, instead suggesting that the 
third-person perspective dampens the emotional response to negative memories, and this 
occurs independently of the present mood state.
In addition, although Kuyken and Howell (2006) demonstrated that depressed 
adolescents were more likely to retrieve both positive and negative memories from the 
third-person perspective than non-depressed controls, methodological flaws make clear
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interpretations difficult. As in a number of studies supporting Sutin and Robins (2008) 
model, this correlational design fails to directly measure individuals precise appraisals of 
the mental events and to measure affect pre and post imagining the mental event. This 
makes distinguishing such evidence in support of either the salient-self or the 
dispassionate observer very difficult.
Other studies have shown support for both the dispassionate observer and the 
salient-self view within one study. Bemsten, Willert and Rubin (2003) found that Danish 
students reporting PTSD symptomology, compared to those who had a traumatic memory 
but did not report PTSD symptoms, were significantly more likely to retrieve the 
traumatic memory from a third-person perspective than a first-person perspective. They 
were also more likely to report their traumatic memories as greater in emotional affect, 
and be more likely to have avoidant coping strategies. This suggests that “dispassionate 
observer” perspective is taken as a means to limit the emotional processing and impact of 
the memories which threaten the self.
In addition, these “PTSD” participants reported that their traumatic memories were 
more central to their current identity, and therefore congruent to the current self, so the 
salient-self theory could explain that a third-person perspective was taken to amplify the 
congruence between the past and current self. Perhaps this amplified congruence enhances 
the feelings of threat and maintains the PTSD symptomology. The dispassionate observer 
view could not explain why a third-person perspective would be taken for a memory that 
is congruent to the current self. Thus, such evidence that begins to measure aspects of both 
appraisal processes, demonstrates that findings can be explained to support both the 
salient-self and the dispassionate observer view, but cannot be fully explained by either. 
These findings would need to extend beyond a cross-sectional investigation of a clinical 
diagnosis in a non-clinical population for a more robust conclusion.
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What the model cannot explain?
Although Sutin and Robins’ (2008) combination of these competing views has 
allowed a framework from which to begin to understand the role of imagery perspective in 
autobiographical memory and imagery on emotion, much of the supporting evidence 
cannot implicate a clear causal role of imagery perspective due to correlational designs.
Furthermore, recent evidence (Holmes, Coughtrey & Connor, 2008) suggests that 
third-person perspective in positive imagery is associated with reduced positive affect, 
suggesting like the earlier theories that the role of third-person perspective on emotion is 
independent of the valence of the image. Such findings cannot be explained by either the 
salient-self or the dispassionate observer perspective because both views posit that a 
motive for self-enhancement will be pursued, and enhanced by the third-person 
perspective. For example, Holmes et al (2008) were the first to demonstrate positive 
imagery has causal effect on positive affect when they measured participants’ positive 
affect pre and post imagery. They found that imagining 100 positively resolved scenarios 
from a third-person perspective significantly reduced participants’ positive affect 
compared to pre-test. This effect was also found in participants in the control condition, 
who were instructed to think about the word-meaning used in the scenarios. However, 
imagining these same scenarios from a first-person perspective significantly increased 
positive affect. So a third-person perspective may not only dampen emotion for negative 
imagery, but also for positive imagery. However, because this effect was also found in the 
control condition, we cannot conclude that the mechanism of this effect was the 
perspective taken.
A powerful extension to this study would have been to identify if there were 
differences between those higher and lower in affect at pre-test as this may have provided 
information on cognitive-affective crossfire hypothesis.
In addition, Sutin and Robins (2008) model fails to account for the cross-cultural 
findings of Cohen and Gunz (2002) that people from the East are more likely than people
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from the West to recall memories from an observer perspective, perhaps due to an Asian 
cultural demand of strict self-observation.
Additional moderators
In summary, according to Sutin and Robins (2008) the motivational processes of 
self-verification and self-enhancement predict the perspective taken and the resulting 
impact on emotion. In addition to these appraisals of mental event content, factors such as 
age of memory appear to be associated to memory perspective and related affect 
(Robinson and Swanson, 1993). Indeed, Bemsten and Rubin (2006) found that 
undergraduates were more likely to retrieve negative emotional memories from a third- 
person perspective, but this was reduced to a trend when controlling for retention interval 
(age of memory).
In addition, Sutin and Robins (2010) acknowledge that individual differences, such 
as personality, are likely to play a role in moderating the perspective used in memory 
recall. For example, narcissists would be likely to recall positive memories from a third- 
person perspective because this would amplify their positive evaluation of themselves and 
positive affect (salient self), much like watching themselves on videotape. However, they 
did not find any effect of the Big Five personality traits (John, Naumann & Soto, 2008) on 
perspective, but other individual difference factors such as anxiety were more associated 
with a third-person perspective. It is possible that the personality traits, such as narcissism, 
were perhaps too broad a concept, that include more specific dispositions, such as anxiety 
and impulsivity which are associated to different perspectives.
It seems then that factors of the memory and individual differences may influence 
the perspective taken. Furthermore, such individual differences will determine the 
influence of these perspectives on affect. Using a more unique methodology to elicit 
perspective, Jiang and Wyer (2009) explored the individual difference of natural 
processing style -  verbalisers or visualisers. They asked undergraduates to listen to 
statements describing different events, which elicited either a first- or third-person
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perspective, by using the terms “came” or “went” respectively. For example, “the terrorist 
came into the restaurant and shot 12 people” (first-person perspective), and “the terrorist 
went into the restaurant and shot 12 people” (third-person perspective). Students were 
asked to either imagine these events (imagination condition), or listen to the words 
(comprehension condition) and rate their emotional response. In the imagination 
condition, participants viewed both positively and negatively valenced events with more 
extreme emotional reactions when scenarios elicited through a first-person rather than a 
third-person perspective.
However, within the comprehension condition, the effect of perspective depended 
on processing style -  visualisers who have a greater tendency to imagine, or verbalisers 
who have a greater tendency to explore verbal aspects of the scenario. The extremity of 
verbalisers ratings did not vary as a function of perspective, but visualisers rated the 
emotional events as more extreme when read through a first-person perspective.
Therefore, when no direction to “imagine” is presented, individual differences on imagery 
tendencies will predict the influence of perspective on affect.
Gender may be another individual difference predicting perspective. Huebner and 
Fredrickson (1999) highlight that women compared to men, are more likely to have a 
third-person perspective for their memories, and also experience more negative affect to 
these memories than men, such as anxiety and shame. Authors argue this is evidence for 
their objectification theory (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997) which posits that cultural 
practices of objectifying womens’ bodies have led women to internalise a third-person 
perspective of themselves. Implications would be for studies to control for gender when 
examining the role of imagery perspective on emotion.
Research has thus moved on from the older view that third-person perspective 
always dampens emotion and distances the self from the past, acknowledging that imagery 
perspective can have differential effects on emotion depending on individual differences
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of the person -  such as processing style, depression, culture, gender and the content of the 
image.
An indirect role: moderated by the construal of an event in relation to the self
However, recent research that accounts for moderators when considering the role 
of imagery perspective on emotion, sheds new light on this earlier proposal that a third- 
person perspective universally dampens emotion, and also makes novel predictions to 
Sutin and Robins (2008) model. Libby and Eibach (2011) posit that imagery perspective 
does not directly determine the emotional impact of an image, but rather the perspective 
taken determines whether people focus on the concrete details of the image and the 
experiences related to this, in a bottom-up manner (first-person perspective) or focus on 
the meaning of the event in relation to the broad context of their lives, in a top-down 
manner (third-person perspective). Thus, an action (e.g., “wrapping a gift”) is understood 
in terms of components (e.g., “using scissors”, “wrapping the paper”) from the first-person 
perspective, but in terms of connections to causes, consequences, traits, and identities 
from the third-person perspective (e.g., “celebrating a friend’s birthday”, “being a good 
friend”). The resulting emotion will depend upon which construal, and perspective is 
taken. This is a bidirectional model in which imagery perspective determines the 
interpretation and the interpretation determines the perspective, and so imagery 
perspective is a representational tool (Libby and Eibach, 2011).
Crucially, events are emotional because of the concrete details of the event, but 
also because of the broader meaning of the event in relation to ones self-concept.
Therefore, if thinking about an event in relation to ones self-concept decreases the events 
emotional significance, then a third-person perspective will be seen to dampen the 
emotional response. However, if thinking about an event within the broader context of 
ones life has a more powerful emotional impact, then picturing the event form the third- 
person rather than first-person perspective increases its emotional impact. Accepting these 
differential predictions of the role of perspective, allows for a broader self concept
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotions
including factors such as self-esteem to also play a role in imagery perspective and 
emotion.
For example, Libby, Valenti, Pfent and Eibach (2011), explored that when the 
objective (bottom up) elements of failure are held constant, people with low self-esteem 
have more extreme negative reactions, than people with high self-esteem. Therefore, self­
esteem influences reactions to failure in a top-down manner, and according to Libby and 
Eibach (2011) one would expect people with low self-esteem to have more extreme 
negative reactions, only when they use a third-person perspective. Libby et al (2011) 
asked participants to list their personal strengths and weaknesses after being required to 
consider an image of personal failure, where greater overgeneralisation from failure to the 
self was operationalised as greater and faster responses to descriptive words of 
weaknesses over strength words. Only when failure was pictured from third-person 
perspective did low self-esteem predict greater accessibility of personal weaknesses 
relative to strengths. Furthermore, picturing failure form a third-person perspective 
increased feelings of shame amongst those with low self-esteem but decreased feelings of 
shame amongst those with high self-esteem. It then seems possible that earlier work by 
Bersnten and Rubin (2006) which failed to find that reflexive emotions such as shame had 
more third-person perspective, could have been a result of not accounting for individual 
differences within an experimental design.
These findings show that picturing failure from a third-person perspective will 
cause participants to frame the failure in relation to their self-concept, rather than in terms 
of concrete details. This serves to increase negative feelings for people with low self­
esteem, for whom failure is crucial to their feelings of self-worth. However, for 
individuals with high self-esteem, the result is adaptive, perhaps allowing them to consider 
the insignificance of this failure in relation to their life context. The third-perspective then 
plays a differential role in predicting the self-conscious emotion of shame, depending on 
the individual difference variable of self-esteem. Thus, the third-person perspective does 
not universally dampen emotion, as earlier accounts would predict.
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotions 139
Supporting this idea, experimental research by Valenti, Libby and Eibach (2011) 
explored the role of perspective in the emotion of regret. Regret of an action comes from 
personal experience of the action, whereas regret for inaction comes more from a sense of 
lost opportunity when people reflect on how that inaction has affected their life as a whole 
(Gilovich & Medvech, 1995). Therefore, authors predicted, and found, that a third-person 
perspective would reduce regret for actions, because the feeling of regret in this case 
depends on bottom-up experiences which are less dominant in a third-person perspective. 
This appears to support the view that a third-person perspective dampens emotion 
(Robinson & Swanson, 1993). However, a third-person perspective increased regret for 
inactions relative to a first-person perspective. This suggests perspective influenced how 
people understand events as they picture them, and a third-person perspective causes 
people to consider events in the context of the events broader meaning in their lives -  a 
consideration which is conducive to enhanced feelings of regret for inaction.
Importantly, in both cases perspective does not directly impact the emotional 
impact of the event, but rather third-person perspective reflects the interpretation of the 
event and its meaning in relation to broader life context, and this interacts with the details 
of an event. Additional support comes from Zermatten and Van der Linden (2008). They 
found, in a large sample of non-clinical adults, that individuals exhibiting a proneness to 
checking behaviours (e.g. “I check things more often than necessary”) were more likely to 
recall the last time they had done certain behaviours, e.g. washed their hands, from a third- 
person perspective, than individuals who do not exhibit such checking-proneness. This 
could suggest according to Libby and Eibach’s model (2011) that individuals with 
checking behaviours frame these actions as important to their self-concept, and so the 
third-person perspective is taken. These individuals also recalled less detail and 
confidence in their checking memories, implying that these memories are important but 
are poorly recalled. This suggests that a third-person perspective could be associated to the 
cause, and certainly the maintenance of individuals with such presenting problems. To this 
end, third-person imagery perspective has been implicated in the cause and maintenance
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of Body Dysmorphic Disorder (Osman, Cooper, Hackman & Veale, 2004), social anxiety 
(Clark & Wells, 1995; Spurr & Stopa, 2002) and PTSD (Bemsten, Willert & Rubin,
2003).
The role of third-person imagery perspective in maintaining negative mental 
wellbeing was experimentally demonstrated by Lau, Moulds and Richardson (2009). 
Ostracism (social exclusion) was manipulated by a virtual ball toss game, such that 
inclusion versus exclusion was manipulated by participants virtually receiving a high 
versus low number of ball passes respectively. Participants rated emotions, e.g. “I felt 
inadequate/ non-existent during the game” and then recalled the event from the first- or 
third-person perspective, before rating emotions again. Lau et al (2009) found that 
ostracising induced negative affect in all participants, but these negative effects were 
ameliorated when participants recalled the game from a first-person perspective. 
Participants who recalled the ostracism from a third-person perspective maintained their 
level of negative psychological outcomes.
These findings may be explained by Libby and Eibach (2011), as a forced third- 
person perspective leads participants to construe the event in terms of its broader meaning 
to their self-concept, perhaps considering the meaning of this rejection to their life. 
However, a first-person perspective would focus on the bottom-up details of the event, 
perhaps allowing specific interpretations such as “they did not pass the ball to me ’ rather 
than more life-general interpretations such as “I am rejected”.
An implication of this model is that it is not the valence or the desirability of an 
event that predicts the perspective taken. Instead, it is the congruence of the represented 
self to the current self (Libby & Eibach, 2002). This contradicts Sutin and Robins (2008) 
proposal that positive and negative events will be appraised differently, due to the motive 
of self-enhancement. For example, people tend to use the third-person perspective when 
visualising behaviours that conflict with their current self-view. This reveals that people 
are more likely to consider the meaning of an event in the context of their life more
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broadly, if they have since changed (Libby & Eibach, 2002). This effect of perspective 
occurs regardless of whether remembering a positive event or a negative event and thus a 
third-person perspective does not necessarily function to reduce the emotional impact 
from a negatively evaluated imagined self, but also from a self that is positive (Libby & 
Eibach, 2011).
Libby and Eibach’s (2011) model suggests that imagery perspective does not 
directly determine emotion, but individuals interpretations of mental events in relation to 
their self-concept influences the role of perspective, and perspective influences these 
interpretations. Therefore, a third-person perspective can also enhance emotions resulting 
from mental events (Libby et al, 2011; Valenti et al, 2011) and this is not just for negative 
emotions, but also for positive ones (Holmes et al, 2008).
In summary, Sutin and Robins (2008) posit that emotional reactions occurring 
from imagery from both the third and first-person perspective will reflect the individuals’ 
drives of self-enhancement and self-verification. For Libby and Eibach (2011) emotional 
reactions occurring from imagery from the third-person perspective will reflect event’s 
meaning in context to an individuals life more broadly, as defined by the structures that 
comprise the self-concept (e.g., self-schemas). Emotional reactions occurring from 
imagery taking a first-person perspective will reflect the impact of considering the 
concrete features of the situation, apart from these general beliefs about the self.
These proposals of the role of imagery perspective in emotion, overlap particularly 
in the consideration of congruence to the self. Both Sutin and Robins (2008) and Libby 
and Eibach (2011) consider that a third-person perspective will be used when a past or 
future event is incongruent to the current self. However, these models make differential 
predictions about the role of imagery perspective with regard to affect-laden mental 
events. Sutin and Robins (2008) posit that the valence of an event is crucial in predicting 
the perspective that will be taken, whereas Libby and Eibach (2011) do not give any 
weight to the desirability of a mental event.
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Discussion
This review of the literature aimed to identify the different roles of imagery 
perspective in emotion. A third-person perspective has been shown to universally dampen 
emotion (Robinson & Swanson, 1993), to dampen negative affect and amplify positive 
affect (Sutin & Robins, 2008) and to alter affect according to the emotional response when 
considering the meaning of an event in relation to ones broader life context (Libby & 
Eibach, 2011).
It is difficult to establish between these various predictions, due to the limitations 
of the evidence. Correlational designs in many of the studies mean that causal conclusions 
are restricted, and robust experimental designs that include pre and post measures of 
emotion and non-imagery control groups, need to be employed to address this. In addition, 
much of the supporting evidence can be explained by one of the two models proposed but 
this is quite different from evidence that clearly supports the model. For example, 
although Sutin and Robins (2008) explain many findings, much of this “evidence” fails to 
directly measure the appraisal processes that are occurring. Therefore, the mechanisms 
behind the effects still remain unclear, and unverified. Methods that directly measure, or 
indeed manipulate the appraisal of imagery content will add clarity to this issue.
Further methodological limitations include that emotions experienced when 
reliving autobiographical memories are confounded by the emotions experienced at the 
time that the memory occurred, whereas future projections may be novel situations for 
which an emotional response is newly constructed. It is important to remember such 
distinctions when drawing on this evidence to support either model, particularly when the 
current review appears to demonstrate more of a memory literature base for Sutin and 
Robins (2008), compared to an imagery literature base for Libby and Eibach (2011).
Finally, of course even the more robust experimental designs assume that an 
imagery perspective can be forced. Studies do account for this assumption by checking for 
their manipulation for example by asking participants to rate their perspective taken -  e.g.
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along a continuum. A continuum allows for a more accurate representation of the 
perspective participants use, whereas a dichotomised approach such as if an event is not 
rated as first-person perspective, then it is taken to be third-person, may lead to an over­
estimation of a third-person perspective. Differential effects have been found for forced 
versus naturally occurring perspective for memory details (Bemsten & Rubin, 2006).
In addition, the models explored above posit distinct mechanisms that interact with 
the imagery perspective taken, to predict resultant emotion. Thus, explicit testing of these 
models requires manipulation of appraisals or activated self-concepts. The work of Libby 
et al (2011) goes some way to address this need, but future work must continue this if a 
more accurate understanding of the role of visual imagery perspective in emotion is to be 
gleaned.
The present review was limited by its inclusion of peer-reviewed literature only, 
subjecting the presented knowledge to a publication bias. In addition, the organising 
feature of the data was the two main models of Sutin and Robins (2008) and Libby and 
Eibach (2011). This is only one way in which to explore and represent the role of visual 
imagery perspective in emotion and one must keep an open mind to the way in which data 
can be understood through a different lens.
Future directions
A review of the literature has allowed for gaps in our current understanding of the 
role of visual imagery perspective in emotion to be highlighted. Most importantly, future 
research should strive to establish the role of visual imagery perspective in emotion, and 
identify the mechanisms by which this occurs. Notably, the majority of research has been 
conducted in adult samples. However, the ability to create visual mental representations of 
events is not unique to adults (e.g. Holmes, Creswell & O’Connor, 2007) and adolescence 
is a time of risk and opportunity for individuals future mental health (Schulenberg, Maggs,
& Hurrelmann, 1999), and changes in the self-concept (Shapka & Keating, 2005). The 
exploration of the role of visual imagery perspective in emotion during adolescence may
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aid our understanding of cause and maintenance of psychopathology at a time of high risk. 
Longitudinal designs would break out of the cause/effect loop of correlational designs, and 
allow for a robust exploration of mechanisms.
Future imagery research also needs to account for the role of auditory and 
kinaesthetic imagery which may account to some extent for variability in emotional 
responses to imagery. In addition, to consider events relating to more precise emotions 
known to play a role in psychopathology, such the self-conscious emotion of shame 
(Tangney, Wagner & Gramzow, 1992). Finally, in order to establish a comprehensive 
understanding of the role of visual imagery perspective in emotion, future studies need to 
include individual difference variables, and establish whether the models can account for
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotions
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Abstract
The application process for the Doctorate in Clinical Psychology (DClinPsych) begins 
with the application to the clearing house on the application form. Traditional methods for 
shortlisting candidates for interview is by rating these application forms. However, the 
validity of this process in fairly selecting future trainees has been questioned particularly 
when high numbers of application forms are being completed with very similar content. 
The Surrey DClinPsych has used a written test in the selection process since 2009, which 
is completed by all applicants who meet the course’s minimum criteria. Applicant scores 
are ranked and those who score within the top 108 are invited to attend for interview. The 
current evaluation was commissioned by the Surrey Clinical Psychology Selection 
Committee principally to assess whether the written test introduced the potential for a bias 
towards younger applicants who may be more recently practiced in timed written tests. 
The evaluation considered the age profiles of applicants and those accepted onto courses 
both nationally (2004 -  2011) and at Surrey (2009 -2011). Surrey’s profile of applicant 
and accepted applicant age, appeared to mirror that of the national age proportions that 
applied and were accepted. However, some potential age biases were revealed within the 
Surrey procedure: applicants that scored within the top 108 on the written test were 
significantly younger than those who did not. There was no difference in age of those 
offered a place following interview, and those who were not. Furthermore, older 
applicants appear to have a higher likelihood of meeting minimum criteria than younger 
applicants, whereas younger applicants appear to have a higher likelihood of being invited 
for interview. Explanations and implications of these findings are discussed.
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Introduction
Each year, thousands of graduates seek a place on the postgraduate DClinPsych in 
the UK (e.g. 3528 applications in 2011, for 569 places; CHPCCP). The volume of 
applications has produced a high reliance on courses screening application forms in order 
to select candidates for interview (Keenan, 1997). The validity of the heuristics used in 
screening is questioned by the low inter-rater agreement and a potential bias against 
applications from ethnic minorities (Boyle, Baker, Bennett, & Charman, 1993) whilst the 
application form itself is understood to seldom reflect the unique responses of the 
applicant alone (John, 2010). Consequently, fairly selecting applicants for interview on 
the basis of these forms becomes a challenging task, especially when larger numbers of 
applicants are meeting minimum criteria (e.g. an upper second class degree, which is a 
common academic requirement for selection, has become easier to achieve, Roth, 1998).
In attempts to improve selection, some programs have introduced additional 
objective measures for evaluating competence prior to interview. At Surrey an additional 
stage in the application process has been in force since 2009, in which all applicants 
meeting the minimum criteria (2:1 degree minimum, GBC, UK citizenship, 9 months of 
clinically relevant work experience) are invited to sit a written assessment prior to 
interview. Only those who then score in the top 108 are invited to interview for, on 
average, 28 places. The test is completed by hand in 45 minutes, and tests research design 
skills and data comprehension. A similar assessment stage in selection has also been 
introduced by other programs (e.g., Lancaster, Leicester, Salomons and Shropshire and 
Staffordshire) in efforts to reduce bias and subjectivity of selecting for interview on the 
basis of application forms alone.
In evaluating their selection process, Hemmings and Simpson (2008) show that 
written test scores at Lancaster predict application success independent of aspects that 
may be rated on application forms (e.g. amount of experience) and independent from 
scores at other stages of selection (e.g. interview or presentation scores). Furthermore, the
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written test was shown to hold some predictive validity of performance on the course (e.g. 
on written assignments). However, both the written test and variables from the application 
form were found to be associated with a variety of proxies of course performance, with 
inconsistencies between years and little clarity as to which proxies of course performance 
would indicate a highly competent psychologist.
Despite the potential utility of the written test in predicting future success and 
competence, the Lancaster course team identified a decline in the number of applications 
they received and queried if this was a result of the written test they introduced 
(Hemmings & Simpson, 2008). An evaluation of applicants’ views of the test revealed that 
some applicants felt it discriminated against those who had left university some years 
previously who may have vast clinical experience (Simpson, Hemmings, Daiches &
Amor, 2010). However, the Lancaster course has seen no changes in the age of applicants 
or the age of successful candidates, since introducing the test in 2006 (Hemmings &
Simpson, 2008).
At Surrey, a previous service evaluation of the Surrey written test indicated a 
perception amongst some applicants that the test favoured recent graduates (Spokes,
2009). Furthermore, anecdotal observation suggested that cohorts of trainees are younger, 
and curiosities arose about whether this perceived reduction in age is reflected nationally.
As a result, the current evaluation was commissioned by the Surrey Clinical Psychology 
Selection Committee as part of the continuing drive to ensure that selection procedures 
provide equal opportunity for all candidates. The following questions were addressed:
• Has applicant age profile changed since the introduction of the written test at 
Surrey compared to the national applicant profile?
• Does applicant age reduce throughout the stages of application process at Surrey?
If so, at which stages?
• Does applicant age profile remain stable across the three years that the written test 
has been used (2009, 2010, 2011)?
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Method
Design
An archival data study of SPSS data files of Surrey applicant characteristics, 
entered from the application forms, between 2009 and 2011, and Excel data files supplied 
by the CHPCCP.
Data sources
National data. The total number of applicants, and number of applicants falling 
within each age band to all of the DClinPsych courses between 2004 and 2011 was 
provided by the CHPCCP. Age bands were: 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39,40-44 and 45-49 
years old.
Surrey data. The CHPCCP provided the number of applicants to Surrey within 
each age band noted above (plus age bands of 50-54 and 55+) from 2008 to 2011. Surrey 
also recorded the success of each applicant at each stage of the application process; this 
was matched to each participant’s exact age (in years) as recorded on the application form.
The stages of application were: meeting minimum criteria, shortlisted for interview (in the 
top 108 of the written test), offered place, and accepting a place, from 2009 to 2011. There 
were a total of 437 applicants to Surrey in 2009, 437 in 2010 and 709 in 2011.
Ethics
Courses receive anonymised aggregated national data with anonymised course- 
specific data. The Surrey applicant data had been entered by a research assistant and 
anonymised by the admissions tutor prior to analysis. The data files used in this evaluation 
consisted of age and progress in the selection process only so that the analyst could not 
identify any candidates at Surrey. The Chair of the Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences 
Ethics Committee confirmed that use of the archive to address selection-related service 
evaluation questions did not require ethical approval.
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Analysis & Results 
National age trends
National trends were investigated by plotting the percentage of applicants and 
accepted applicants (i.e. those offered a place) from each age group both between years 
and within years. Figure 1 demonstrates that the majority of National applicants, and those 
accepted are within the youngest age bands, 20-24 and 25-29; individuals between 20-29 
constituted 75-78% of applications between 2004 and 2011, and 81-84% of accepted 
applicants between 2004-2011. A consistent picture is that the proportion of acceptances is 
greater than the proportion of applicants in the 25-29 group. In contrast, for all age groups 
older than 30, the proportion of acceptances is lower than the proportion of applications.
The proportion of applicants in the age groups older than 30 has remained stable since 
2004 and in the 20-24 and 25-29 group has remained stable since 2007.
60%
50%
40%
20%
10%
0%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
20-24 A pplied
— 20-24 Accepted 
— ■—  25-29 A pplied 
— b —  25-29 Accepted 
— *—  30-34 A pplied 
■a -  30-34 Accepted 
— *—  35-39 A pplied 
— * — 35-39 Accepted 
— *—  40-44 A pplied
— * — 40-44 Accepted 
— —  45-49 Applied 
— » — 45-49 Accepted
Year of application
Figure 1. National trends in age of applicants and accepted applicants from 2004 to 2011.
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National versus Surrey age trends: 2008-2011
The percentage of Surrey applicants, and those accepted, in each age band 
appeared to be fairly consistent with national trends between 2008 and 2011. The 
proportion of applicants in each age category did not differ significantly between Surrey 
and National applicantsl in 2008 (5) = 6.38, p = .266), 2009 (x2 (5) = 1.51, p = .911)
and 2011 (%2 (5) = 1.07, p = .958). However, in 2010, these percentages were not in line 
with national percentages (%2 (5) = 18.2, p =.003), and this appears to be due to a greater 
proportion of applicants in the 45+ age category to Surrey, than applied nationally (z = 
2.76). Overall though, similar to the national data in Figure 1, Surrey applicants aged 20- 
24 and 25-29 constitute the majority of applications (Figure 2) and acceptances (Figure 3), 
with 25-29 year olds on average constituting a greater proportion of applicants and 
acceptances than 20-24 year olds.
It is notable that the acceptance of 20-24 years olds at Surrey was above the 
national average in 2009 and 2011. The acceptance of 30-34 year olds was below the 
national average from 2008-2010. However, there were no significant variations from 
national percentages in each age category of acceptances from 2008 to 20112 (2008: %2 (2) 
= .815, p = .737,2009: f  (2) = 4.22, p = .114,2010: x2 (2) = .107, p = .948, 2011: f  (2) = 
1.19, p = .553).
1 6 categories were used for analyses (20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39,40-44,45+) due to small 
expected values (<1) in older age categories for Surrey. Categories over 45 years were combined 
into “45+”.
2 3 categories were used for analyses (20-24,25-29, 30+) due to small expected values (<1) in 
older age categories for Surrey. Categories over 35 years were combined into “30+”.
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Figure 2. National and Surrey percentage of applicants within each age band from 2008 to 
2 0 1 1 .
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Figure 3. National and Surrey percentage of accepted applicants within each age band 
from 2008 to 2011.
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Stages of application
Average age. The median age of Surrey candidates at each stage of selection can 
be seen in Table 1. It appears there is little change in the average age of candidates 
successful at each stage between years, although some indication of a decline in average 
age as candidates progress through the application process. In the analyses below, non- 
parametric tests are reported given age data were not normally distributed.
Table 1. Median age of Surrey applicants successful and unsuccessful at each stage, in 
each year. Interquartile ranges in parentheses.___________________________________
2009 2010 2011 All years
Meeting minimum 27 27 27 27
criteria (25-30) (25-31) (25-30) (25-30)
Shortlisted Yes 26 26 26 26(25-29) (24.25-29) (25-29) (25-29)for No 28 28 27 27interview (26-32) (25-35.5) (25-30) (25-30.25)
Yes 26 26 26 26
Offered a (24-28) (25-29.75) (25-28) (25-29)
place No 27 26 26 26
(25-30) (24-29) (25-29) (25-29)
Between years. A Kruskal-Wallis test was used to compare the average age of 
Surrey applicants meeting Surrey minimum criteria. Average age did not differ across the 
3 years 2009, 2010 and 2011, H (2) = 1.15, p = .564. Furthermore, there was no significant 
effect of year of entry on the average age of candidates shortlisted for interview from 2009 
to 2011 (H (2) = 2.14, p = .898), nor on the average age of candidates offered a place (H 
(2) = .552, p = .759).
Within years. A Mann-Whitney U test was used to compare age of those 
shortlisted for interview (categorised as yes or no) and those offered a place following 
interview (yes or no).
2009. Those shortlisted for interview (Mdn= 26) were significantly younger than 
those not shortlisted for interview in 2009 (Mdn = 28), U = 7754.5, z = -2.76, p = .006, r = 
-.17. The average age of candidates offered a place following interview (Mdn = 26) did
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not significantly differ from the average age of candidates not offered a place following 
interview (Mdn = 27), (U = 1337.5, z = -.871, p = .394, r = -.08).
2010. Those shortlisted for interview (Mdn= 26) were significantly younger than 
those not shortlisted for interview in 2009 (Mdn =28), U = 6933.5, z = -3.65, p < .001, r =
-.22. The average age of candidates offered a place following interview (Mdn = 26) did 
not significantly differ from the average age of candidates not offered a place following 
interview (Mdn = 26), (U = 1813.5, z = -.595, p = 551, r  = -.05).
2011. Those shortlisted for interview (Mdn = 26) were not significantly different in 
average age than those not shortlisted for interview (Mdn = 27), U = 24075, z = -1.94, p = 
.052, r = -.08. The average age of candidates offered a place following interview (Mdn =
26) was not significantly different from the average age of those not offered a place 
following interview (Mdn = 26), U = 1278.5, z = -.647, p = .513, r = -.05.
All years. Analysing all 3 years together, those who were shortlisted for interview 
(Mdn = 26), were significantly more likely to be younger than those who were not 
shortlisted for interview (Mdn = 27), U = 114979, z = -4.45, p <001, r = -.13. Across all 
years (2009 -2011), those who were offered a place following interview (Mdn = 26) were 
no different in age than those not offered a place following interview (Mdn =26), U = 
14167, z = -.480, p = .629, r = -.02.
Age bands. The likelihood of applicants succeeding at different stages of 
selection, according to their age category, can be seen in Table 2. Overall, older applicants 
more often meet minimum criteria than younger applicants but the latter are more likely to 
be shortlisted for interview than older applicants. Following interview, the proportion of 
people in the older groups decreases and mostly reduces to zero and applicants older than 
39 are rarely represented in the group offered a place.
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Table 2. Percentage of applicants within an age category who met minimum criteria, 
percentage of applicants shortlisted from those that met minimum criteria, and percentage 
of applicants offered a place from those that were shortlisted d.________________________
Min. criteria Shortlisted for interview Offered
Age 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
20-24 34.9 34.3 39.2 53.9 57.9 29.1 35.7 18.2 21.4
25-29 75 75
oo
43.7 54.5 24.3 31.7 35.8 21.6
30-34 90.4 100b
oo 34.1 57.5 24.1 18.7 17.4 25.0
35-39 96.2 61.3 60.5 40 15.8 13.0 20 66.7 0
40-44 62.5 76.5 78.9 40 23.1 26.7 0 0 0
45-49 85.7 93.3 64.3 33.3 21.4 11.1 0 62.1 0
50-54 0 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 0
55+ 100 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 0
Note. aDue to inconsistencies in data, 101% of 25-29 year olds met minimum criteria in 2011. 100% has 
been used as an estimate.
b Due to inconsistencies in data, 115% of 30-34 year olds met minimum criteria in 2010. 100% has been 
used as an estimate.
c 100% of those 30-34 year olds who applied met minimum criteria in 2011. 
d Some percentages refer to very small frequencies.____________________________________
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Discussion 
Summary
The present evaluation of the DClinPsych selection process was concerned with 
the age profile of applicants at Surrey, how this may differ from the national age profile 
and how this may change across the selection process. Results revealed that nationally, 
more applications and acceptances were within the younger age groups of 20-24 and 25- 
29 year olds, than any other age groups. Furthermore, it appeared that the proportion of 
Surrey applicants and acceptances within each age band did not differ significantly from 
the national proportions. Therefore applicant and accepted applicant age at Surrey appears 
largely consistent with the national age profile.
Exploring the Surrey application process in more depth, analysis revealed that the 
average age of applicants meeting minimum criteria, being shortlisted for interview, and 
being offered a place did not differ significantly between years 2009 to 2011. However, 
within each year, applicants who were shortlisted for interview were significantly younger 
than applicants who were not shortlisted for interview. The exception to this was in 2011, 
when those shortlisted for interview were no different in age from those not shortlisted. 
Further data collection of future years is needed to identify a clear pattern although it 
appears that younger applicants were more likely to be in the higher scoring group on the 
written test in two of the three years surveyed. Furthermore, individuals in the youngest 
age category (20-24 years) in 2009 and 2010 were more likely to be shortlisted for 
interview than to meet the minimum criteria. It may be that these younger applicants had 
more recently applied their research skills (e.g. undergraduate research projects) or they 
were more recently familiar with the demands of examination conditions. Applicants in 
older age categories were more likely to meet minimum criteria than younger applicants 
perhaps as a result of more years in which to gain the required clinical experience. There 
was also a reduction in the proportion of older applicants after interview. This raises 
questions about whether the interview process favours younger applicants, or it may be
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that smaller frequencies of older applicants means that they are less likely to receive an 
offer given only a quarter of those interviewed can be offered a place.
Limitations
The identified patterns or trends discussed are based on only 3 years of data from 
Surrey, with a difference in age according to performance on the written test seen only in 
2 of these years (2009 and 2010), making definitive conclusions premature.
Unfortunately, no data is held for the years preceding the introduction of the 
written test in 2008, an investigation of which would be essential to identify if the current 
age profiles are consistent with a longstanding trend, and if there was a significant change 
in application ages or numbers when the test was introduced. Due the data coming from 
two different sources, there was also a lack of applicant matched data following from 
application to acceptance -  the Surrey data only began at the stage of meeting minimum 
criteria. Matching stage of application to each applicant from the beginning to the end of 
the process would be useful to further investigate how applicant age may influence the 
stage of application reached. Finally, age may be a reasonable proxy for recency of 
undergraduate study, but it would be more accurate to record time since last study at 
undergraduate or postgraduate level.
Future work
Future work could account for other predictors of written test success which have 
been found to predict applicant acceptance (e.g. academic ability such as degree class and 
vocational experience such as a greater range and number of relevant clinical posts; 
Phillips, Hatton & Gray, 2004). It also seems pertinent for future work to explore the 
utility of the written test. For example, is there a correlation between performance at 
written test and future competencies (e.g. academic assignment performance on the 
course)? Is this an effect that is independent of age? However, such investigations would 
be limited by the pass/fail grading system used at Surrey which limits variability in 
assessment outcomes.
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotions
Service presentation
These results were presented at the Surrey DClinPsych selection committee 
meeting in March 2013. Evidence of this presentation can be seen in Appendix 1.
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Email correspondence confirming presentation of SRRP
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f.warren@surrey.ac.uk 
Tue 12/03/2013 13:46
Inbox
To: Williams AJ Miss (PG/R - Psychology); 
Cc:Simonds LM Dr (Psychology);
You replied on 12/03/2013 14:53.
Dear Alice,
Thank you very much for your interesting and clear presentation this morning on 
selection. Would it be possible to have either a summary of the project or your slides to 
attach to the selection committee minutes from today?
With many thanks and best wishes,
Fiona
Dr Fiona Warren 
Department of Psychology 
University of Surrey 
Guildford 
GU2 7XH
Tel: 01483 686944
Please note: I work on Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays
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Final Reflective Account
On becoming a clinical psychologist: A retrospective, developmental, reflective account
of the experience of training
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotions
On my personal and professional journey through Clinical training, it has often 
been wise or kind words from others that have helped and encouraged me through difficult 
times. Most recently I have been relayed the following Japanese proverb by friends and 
family which felt relevant in reflecting upon my personal and professional journey 
throughout training: “The nail that sticks up gets hammered down”. Although this might 
have negative connotations, and there are indeed some that I will discuss, it was this quote 
that led me to reflect on some key points of my journey through clinical placements on 
training. I would like to share some of these key moments, what I have learned and how I 
have changed through these challenging times. Ultimately, I conclude that I have moved 
from a difficulty in speaking up in my clinical role to having developed a skill in “sharing 
alternative perspectives” in both personal and professional roles, and reflect on how I can 
bring this into my post-qualification roles.
To begin a reflection of my development, I need to go right back to before training 
when I had attended the interview for training during my final year exams for my 
undergraduate degree. I think the anxiety for the exams, alongside my belief that it was 
highly unlikely that I would get a place on clinical training enabled me to relax during 
interview and drew out the best in me. Aside from that day, I was incredibly anxious about 
training, when I also had to move home to live with my parents again after 4 years away 
and reignite old friendships. There was a lot of change but I started clinical training 
feeling very young, curious and enthusiastic about the opportunities ahead of me.
Although nervous, I recall that at the time I had reassured myself that I had been accepted 
and therefore must have the required skills and competencies.
However, when I began the course I became aware of the age and level of 
experience that those around me had, and I felt incredibly inexperienced in the clinical 
world. At the time I felt that the course were accepting of me and allowed me to feel safe 
in my uncertainty (Mason, 1993), although my first year clinical supervisor was less 
understanding and on placement I felt very unsafe in my uncertainty (Mason, 1993). I 
sought and received reassurance from my peers that my age or lack of experience would
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not affect my development, but my supervisor appeared to disagree, I now think most 
likely because my lack of experience elevated her anxiety. I remember that university felt 
like a space in which I could try things, speak up and make mistakes when learning, but 
being a paid trainee in the clinical placement (in the National Health Service, NHS) with 
that specific supervisor did not afford such liberty. Ultimately I also expected myself to 
learn more quickly and looked to my supervisor for this experience, but was left 
dissatisfied with her contribution to my learning and in turn dissatisfied and not confident 
in my own development. Since those first days and weeks on clinical training I have 
lacked confidence in my clinical competence resulting in me appearing a quiet and 
reserved trainee. This is something that I have consistently since been told on clinical 
placements, with requests of me to develop greater “self-belief’ and speak up with my 
ideas.
Despite a lack of confidence in my clinical competencies, I was and had always 
been a vocal individual. I will rarely struggle to speak up in groups, lectures or seminars 
as was the case throughout my school education and undergraduate degree. As the 
youngest and only girl in a large family where honesty was valued, I think I learned to 
speak up for myself and say things as you see them. In particular to not be afraid to ask 
questions and take a critical evaluative approach to everything I was presented with -  in 
both academic and personal realms. For me, asking questions provided a rich learning 
experience and I brought this developmental strategy with me onto clinical training, 
especially to university.
As you may see, from an early stage in clinical training there was therefore a 
difference between who I presented as in my personal and academic life -  a vocal and 
engaged student, and who I presented as in my NHS roles -  a quiet and anxious trainee. I 
felt so uncomfortable and anxious in my first year clinical placement that all ideas were 
silenced, particularly in the context of a very challenging supervisory relationship. 
However, there have been a number of experiences over the past two and a half years on
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clinical training that have contributed to my development in speaking out and finding my 
voice in clinical placements that I would like to reflect upon.
Firstly, during my first year on clinical training I was placed with a supervisor who 
I believe had little confidence in me, at a time when I too had little confidence in myself. 
Sadly the placement ended incredibly acrimoniously. I finished first year with less 
confidence in myself and due to observing my supervisor, less confidence in clinical 
psychology as providing evidence based and effective interventions for people 
experiencing mental health problems.
One the one hand, this experience led me to withhold my clinical ideas (e.g. 
formulations, intervention ideas) as I had felt so undermined and devalued whenever I 
took a risk and shared these ideas in supervision and because when under threat we are 
less creative and free to explore (e.g. Claxton, 1997). So in one sense I lost my voice in 
my clinical role further through this experience. On the other hand, I decided with the 
support of friends and family that I would speak up about how I felt I had been treated in 
my first year. Instead of letting the power of the supervisor overwhelm me (although I was 
of course incredibly frightened), I shared my experience of the year with university 
supervisors, what I had observed and recorded the supervisor saying to me. It was 
empowering, gave me a sense of control over the situation and raised issues that would 
otherwise been left unsaid, but ultimately I was left with less self-belief and confidence in 
my clinical competence and clinical ideas than before training had begun.
It is powerful for me to now reflect on this supervisory relationship because over 
the past three years I have come to a better understanding of how I learn best. I value 
supervision as place to be curious, inquisitive and creative and can now see how this links 
to my learning in other environments. My learning takes this same model in the academic 
and personal world -  my relationships and research ideas develop when I have space to 
talk it over with someone, to learn from their perspective and challenge and be challenged 
until I have a deeper understanding of all the perspectives. I have always been a student
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that cannot simply apply what I am told, instead I have to have a deeper understanding of 
why and how it works. I now recall my school teachers finding this frustrating. I think 
perhaps some supervisors, like my old school teachers, can find this way of learning 
frustrating because they see supervision as a place to “approve” my ideas rather than 
“explore” ideas with me or have their ideas challenged. I plan to draw this out explicitly in 
a conversation with future supervisors and equally to remember when supervising others 
post-qualified to have a balance between “exploring” and “approving” as they would wish. 
However, I am also aware that supervision will be less frequent post-qualification and so 
the experience of having little space in supervision to explore my ideas has led me to 
depend on providing myself with reflective space — a skill I will utilise post-qualification.
Following the supervisory challenges in first year, I had a reparative supervisory 
relationship in second year with a placement supervisor who was encouraging, and 
although expected a lot from me was able help me to meet her expectations. She created a 
safe space in supervision, first and foremost by having a regular weekly time which she 
stuck to (this has been surprisingly rare during training), and she reflected that she 
observed my integrity and passion for research and clients with whom I was working. I 
was finally so encouraged that my passion, genuine curiosity and care for these clients was 
acknowledged. She also reflected that I had great ideas which I could share more with her 
and with team members (a very positive way of encouraging me to speak up more - in 
contrast to another supervisor who said they thought I had nothing to contribute because I 
remained quiet). Through this space in supervision I was finally able to see this 
contradiction that in my professional life I was so afraid to speak up in front of colleagues 
and share my ideas but feel comfortable being vocal in my personal and university life.
Through this supervisor’s encouragement about my ideas I was able to feel more 
and more confident in expressing my thoughts and developing ideas in supervision. I was 
also encouraged to speak up about my observations about a particular therapeutic group I 
was working in. I shared with my supervisor that I felt unsure this group was effective in 
meeting the needs of the clients and the service. In turn I was asked to share my
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observations with management which ultimately led to a review of the group being 
offered. It was through this process that I was able to use my skills of curiosity and 
speaking up about standards which I feel are not being met, but also learn that solutions 
and ideas need to also be offered. I think in one sense I found it easy to speak up when 
things do not appear good enough (especially if those around you are supportive) but it is 
more difficult for me to then offer my ideas. However, I can see now that it is more useful 
at any level of leadership or management that one needs to come with the other, 
particularly as commenting on things that need improving is bound to always challenge 
someone (in this case a number of colleagues). With my supportive supervisor I was able 
to do both these things -  feed into a management meeting about the group and offer my 
ideas of what might be a more useful way to use their funds. I think this will be something 
that I take forward as I continue to remain curious and speak up about service provisions 
that might not be working so well -  to offer ideas alongside any challenging observations. 
Reading the British Psychological Society leadership document (Division of Clinical 
Psychology, 2010) with my peers has helped me to see the value of these skills that I had 
developed for my future.
It was through the encouragement and guidance of this supervisor that I not only 
developed my own ideas and professional identity (including particular interest in 
systemic ways of working), but also began to attend to instances in which I was holding in 
my thoughts and ideas rather than speaking out as I might in non-professional contexts. I 
came to see myself as having high professional standards, valuing integrity and 
compassion in myself and colleagues and especially valuing curiosity as a means of 
coming to a greater understanding of any situation. As I grew to have a clearer sense of 
some aspects of my professional identity I became more confident in the team I was in 
regarding sharing my views and ideas.
Although this placement was for me a turning point in my training, alongside this 
professional development, aspects of my personal life were becoming increasingly 
challenging. One of my oldest and closest friends was sadly told that her fight with cancer
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would no longer be successful and her care turned palliative. This had a dramatic effect on 
me, and I found myself instantly with a new perspective on life. I found that I suddenly 
did not worry about the outcomes of my coursework and instantly almost free of any 
anxiety related to my clinical work. This personal experience enabled me to be bolder in 
speaking up in the workplace, with the safe support of supervision, and be less fearful of 
being reprimanded.
As I moved into my penultimate placement I tried to carry this developing skill 
and confidence with me where I was working with a client group whom I am particularly 
compassionate toward -  older adults. The supervisory relationship was different to my 
prior placement, being more directive and less facilitative. However, despite the lack of 
invitation to share my ideas, I decided that I would hold on to the ideas I had been 
developing and with the voice of my previous supervisor in my mind “find a way to bring 
them into my practice”. Most of the time I had to work within models I am least 
comfortable in (e.g. CBT) but I was able to take on systemic work with couples and bring 
the ideas into other aspects of my work. I was mindful of holding true to what I was 
interested and believed in whilst respecting my new supervisor’s very different and firm 
ideas -  particularly with an awareness that she was evaluating me.
I had actually been quite nervous about working with this client group because I 
have always been sensitive to the challenges facing older adults (ever since I volunteered 
to work with older adults in a care home at the age of 14). So I was a little disappointed 
that my supervisor was so pragmatic in contrast to my previous supervisor’s reflexivity. I 
was particularly nervous about a piece of work I had to complete in a nursing home which 
colleagues had told me was a “bad home”. I was upset after I had attended the home at the 
standard of care that I saw, and discussed this in supervision. Ultimately my concerns and 
observations led to the involvement of social services and regulatory bodies to investigate 
the care at the home. Although this resulted in the safeguarding of the older adults. I was 
shocked when the response from the service I was in was to question my conduct about 
the speed with which I raised these concerns.
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I had previously read the Francis report (Francis, 2013) and discussed the 
implications of the findings for psychologists with my peers and so was especially 
shocked that in raising service concerns I felt persecuted or blamed for not raising these 
concerns sooner. My systemic experience helped me to see that to speak up had been 
difficult given that colleagues were informing me this was a “bad home” but no one had 
spoken up previously. By speaking up, against others’ ideas of what is “acceptable”, I had 
found a way to bring my ideas into this placement and act upon them. I was upset at the 
way I felt blamed but this soon turned to anger and eventually almost a disgust at the 
perverse and defensive systems that seem to permeate through the NHS (and other 
systems involved). Personally, I recovered quite quickly, and although people were once 
again questioning my competence I noticed that I felt less threatened that in first year. 
Instead I felt confident that I had done the right thing, gave myself the space to learn from 
the situation and reacted with a sense of indifference to the whirlwind around me.
Although indifference might sound too casual, given the circumstances in my 
personal life at this time (a now very unwell close friend), I felt that there was more to life 
than protecting my own job, when all around were trying to do this. I was encouraged by 
stories such as that of Dr Narinder Kapur, a consultant neuropsychologist who spoke up 
about standards of care at Addenbrookes Hospital in Cambridge and was unfairly 
dismissed because his employer had “lost faith” in him. I decided that a blaming NHS, 
where poor practice is commonplace and only addressed through blaming the least 
powerful was our NHS, then I did not particularly mind if I had no future in it.
At the time of writing, questions and investigations are ongoing as blame is shifted 
around the system, but I remain confident enough that I will qualify without questions of 
my competency to practice. However, in reflecting on my response to the situation I am 
aware of a significant change in my fear and anxiety about speaking up in a clinical world. 
In the first year I was petrified to share my concerns (albeit in the context of a bullying 
supervisory relationship) but by final year I was able to speak up despite a non-facilitative 
environment and remain relatively calm in the face of threat. I feel that more than anything
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I have my friend and the new perspective on life which she has given me, to thank for this. 
Despite her strength inspiring me, that is not to say that at present I do not feel “beaten 
down”. I may have found a way to speak up in clinical settings and share my views, but 
given my recent experience I can see why people remain silent and bad practice remains a 
systemic issue in the NHS and beyond. However, this experience has not deterred me such 
that in the future I think I will continue to speak up in clinical roles such that my personal 
and professional identity in aligned.
I am aware that this account has mainly focused on change and development in my 
clinical practice but the research responsibilities of a clinical psychologist have formed a 
large part of my developing professional identity over the past 3 years. I have grown in 
confidence in these research skills where previously the competitive nature of my 
undergraduate degree made this difficult for me to enjoy. The research aspects of clinical 
training have been very enjoyable, I have been incredibly pleased with the supervision and 
learning opportunities provided me by my supervisors and they have acknowledged and 
praised my passion for reading and research. It is amazing how powerful such feedback 
can be (I will remember this when I supervise others), and has led me to consider a future 
career in research, rather than clinical work. In addition, from the beginning of training I 
was told on my clinical placements that I needed to be careful about striking a balance 
between autonomy and dependence from my clinical supervisor (with a tendency to work 
more autonomously). I think autonomy can make clinical supervisors nervous 
(understandably given the clinical responsibility of risk), whereas it may be a more 
relevant skill in research. However, I think that autonomy although not always favoured in 
trainees, will be a well-placed skill in any role post-qualification. For example, the recent 
safeguarding experience has made me more aware that to contribute to the safeguarding of 
those we work with, it is helpful although challenging to not sit so closely within a team 
and constantly challenge the perspective you find yourself holding to avoid the 
complacency I have seen across my placements.
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As I look ahead to completing training I have a greater sense of my professional identity 
including one supervisor providing me with a model of supervision which I hope to take 
forward post-qualification -  providing and requesting a regular, protected safe space for 
clinical supervision which encourages personal and professional growth.
I am most aware of my sadness to leave the secure base that is the university, and 
the team members that have made my experience so enjoyable. I have not been sad to say 
goodbye to any particular placement as yet, as the one placement I really enjoyed I feel I 
have internalised the supervisor and am taking her guidance and those experiences with 
me. I hope that I manage the sadness at leaving the university by maintaining contact with 
the team hopefully through ongoing research.
Over the past three years I have developed a professional identity and integrity, 
and most importantly a developing confidence in my competence to speak up and sharing 
my ideas. Through writing this account I have been struck by how closely I feel this fits 
with my preferred therapeutic model -  narrative therapy. Narrative therapy focuses on 
giving a voice to the subjugated discourse so that thin, problem saturated stories may be 
thickened by other possibilities or identities. Of any therapy, this is the one I would take 
forward (and is the focus of my specialist placement) and I now see how this fits with my 
passion of identifying and “giving voice” to the unsaid. Through my experiences on 
training in overcoming my anxiety and speaking up with my ideas, I feel confident that I 
will take forward this developed skill of “providing an alternative perspective” into any 
post-qualification role. Importantly I feel this is relevant to both clinical and research 
domains.
Similarly through writing this account I can also now see that my development 
through training can also be understood by a narrative account. My identity as a clinical 
psychologist has developed from being “thin”, and “problem-saturated” e.g. “anxious” and 
“quiet” to learning to incorporate other aspects of my identity from other areas of my life 
into my clinical role and thicken my identity as a clinical psychologist. Moving forward
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post-qualification I am reassured that through training I am starting to develop who I am 
as a clinician so that I can take a clear position in clinical teams and supervision.
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Overview of clinical experience 
Adult placement
The first 12 months of training from October 2011 to September 2012 was spent 
working in a Specialist Psychological Therapies team in a Community Mental Health 
Team for adults. Clinical work included individual and group therapy. Individual therapy 
with adults ranging from their twenties to their fifties mainly utilised a Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy basis, ftidividual’s presenting problems included OCD, depression, 
anxiety and bulimia. One case of psychodynamic/ psychoanalytic work was completed 
with a young woman with relationship difficulties. A 12 week CBT-based group was also 
run in the community for adults presenting with depression and anxiety. This was run 
jointly with a community psychiatric nurse.
My work here also included a number of psychometric assessments of adults to 
inform care plans (e.g. strengths and weaknesses) and diagnosis (Learning disability, 
Korsakoff s syndrome). I contributed to service development by proposing an audit of the 
Early Intervention in Psychosis group that was due to start. I also devised and presented a 
CBT skills workshop to the nursing staff on the Adult Inpatient wards with a colleague.
Child placement
Following my first year, in my second year I spent the first 6 months (October 
2012 -  March 2013) working across 2 community Child and Adolescent Mental Health 
services (CAMHS). I was supervised by clinical psychologists working across two 
different teams whose specialist interests were Psychodynamic understanding of Parent- 
Infant attachment and neuropsychology in young people. These services used the Choice 
and Partnership Approach (CAPA). Therapeutic work with young people ages from 6 
years old to 18 years old was informed by CBT, Narrative therapy and Psychodynamic 
principles. Main presenting problems in therapeutic work were depression, anxiety, 
identity difficulties, chronic pain (headaches), encopresis and anger. I was also part of the 
Family Therapy team in the reflective team, bi-weekly for the duration of my placement.
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In addition to therapeutic work, I completed and contributed to a number of assessments 
of Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and running two groups for parents whose children 
had recently received a diagnosis of ASD. Assessment included psychometric assessment, 
school observation and parent/ school interviews. Whilst on this placement I also 
completed an 8 week course in Parent-Infant Attachment. This course required weekly 
reading and an infant observation to be completed.
Adults with Learning Disabilities placement
The following 6 months (April 2013-September 2013) were spent working in a 
NHS funded Social Enterprise providing a community service for adults with Learning 
Disabilities. My main responsibilities included assessment (including neuropsychological 
assessment e.g. for dementia in learning disabilities, and assessments and observations to 
contribute to the ASD clinic) involving a wide network of professionals and families and 
intervention either individually (e.g. therapy, mainly informed by systemic and attachment 
narrative ideas) or for wider systems (e.g. team consultations). My work here was mainly 
driven by systemic theory and therapies.
Older People placement
I worked for 6 months (October 2013-March 2014) in a Community Mental Health 
Team for older adults in which I co-facilitated a 12 week CBT therapy group, and 
provided evidence-based interventions to older adults individually and as couples. The 
individual interventions were mainly informed by CBT and systemic theory. I also 
completed assessments of dementia using psychometric assessment and gathering of 
information from wider sources, and provided training to the MDT in CBT. Finally I 
completed assessment and recommendations for an individual presenting with challenging 
behaviour in a nursing home.
Specialist placement -  Narrative therapy with children and adolescents
Finally I elected to complete a further 6 months (April 2014- September 2014) in 
another CAMHS service, specialising in applying Narrative Therapy to children and their
202
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotions 203
families to a breadth of presenting problems. Presenting problems included moderate to 
severe depression, anxiety, OCD, relationship and attachment difficulties, comorbid with 
ASD and other neurodevelopmental disorders, chronic physical health conditions and 
systemic/ family discord. During my time here I also worked jointly for 6 months with the 
Systemic Family Therapist to run the Family Therapy clinic. Generic skills also developed 
including working within the CAPA model e.g. completing “choice” assessments.
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Assessment Overview
Year I Assessments
P r o g r a m m e
C o m p o n e n t
TITLE OF ASSIGNMENT
Fundamentals of Theory 
and Practice in Clinical 
Psychology (FTPCP)
Short report of WAIS-III data and practice 
administration
Research -SRRP An evaluation of age profiles of applicants to the Surrey 
Clinical Psychology Doctorate
FTPCP -  practice case 
report
Psychodynamic work with a woman presenting with 
relationship difficulties in her twenties
Problem Based Learning 
-  Reflective Account
Reflective account: The Relationship to change
Research -  Literature 
Review
The role of visual imagery perspective in emotion: A 
review
Adult -  case report Case report of a man in his twenties with obsessions and 
compulsions
Adult -  case report Psychometric assessment of a 44 year old male with 
Korsakoff s syndrome
Research -  Qualitative 
Research Project
Trainee’s perceptions and experiences of self-disclosure 
in a therapeutic setting
Research -  Major 
Research Project 
Proposal
The role of visual perspective and aspects of the self in 
predicting negative emotions as an outcome of failure 
imagery
Year II Assessments
P r o g r a m m e
C o m p o n e n t
TITLE OF ASSESSMENT
Research Research Methods and Statistics test
Professional Issues 
Essay
DSM-5 is scheduled to appear in 2013. It is likely that 
developmental trauma will not be included. Critically 
review the implications of such a decision for clinical 
psychologists and service users and carers across the
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lifespan.
Problem Based 
Learning -  Reflective 
Account
Reflective account: working with a complex family and 
their systems
Child and Family -  
Case Report
Narrative therapy for encopresis with a 6-year old girl
Personal and 
Professional Learning 
Discussion Groups -  
Process Account
Process account of PPLDG
People with Learning 
Disabilities -  Oral 
Presentation of Clinical 
Activity
Development in integrative formulation and self 
reflexivity through working with a woman in her twenties 
with a Learning Disability.
Year III Assessments
P r o g r a m m e
C o m p o n e n t
ASSESSMENT TITLE
Research -  MRP 
Portfolio
Visual imagery perspective and negative emotional 
responses in young people.
Personal and 
Professional Learning -  
Final Reflective 
Account
On becoming a clinical psychologist: A retrospective, 
developmental, reflective account of the experience of 
training
Older People -  Case 
Report
Neuropsychological Case Report of a 65 year old woman 
presenting with a possible Dementia
